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A time brokerage agreement' is a contract involving the sale by
a broadcast licensee2 of "discrete blocks of time to a 'broker' that
supplies the programming to fill that time and sells the commercial
spot announcements in it."' 3 Today,4 the parties to a time brokerage
agreement are usually the owner of an unprofitable radio or televi-
sion station (the "brokered" station) and the owner of a stronger,
more profitable station (the "brokering" station,5 which is usually
a prospective purchaser of the weaker station). 6 After a time bro-
kerage agreement is executed, the two stations will frequently share
1. Time brokerage agreements are also known as, inter alia, "local marketing agree-
ments," ("LMAs"), and "time brokerage arrangements." See, e.g., Petition for Issuance
of Interpretive Ruling Concerning FCC Form 395-B, Broadcast Annual Employment
Report, 9 F.C.C.R. 2535, 2535 & n.1 (1994); Letter from Barbara A. Kreisman, Chief,
Video Services Division, to Paramount Stations Group of Kerrville, Inc. & KRRT, Inc.,
No. 1800E1-AL, slip op. at 9 (M. Med. Bur. June 6, 1995). Throughout this Article, the
terms "time brokerage agreement" and "LMA" will be used interchangeably, as the two
terms seem to be the most frequently used in common discourse.
2. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (defining "licensee" as "the holder
of a ... station license granted or continued in force under authority of this chapter.");
WILLIAM B. RAY, FCC: THE UPS AND DOWNS OF RADIO-TV REGULATION xvii (1st ed.
1990) ("[e]veryone who transmits any sound or image by radio or television must first
obtain a license from the FCC").
3. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(a)(3)(iv)(1994).
4. Before the 1980s, time brokerage "involved a limited amount of a licensee's
broadcast week, often split among several different brokers." Stephen F. Sewell, The
Federal Communications Commission and Time Brokerage: A Regulatory Change of
Course, 3 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 89, 98 (1995). In fact, until 1989 a broker could not,
under FCC policy, be the licensee of another station in the same market as the brokered
station. Id. at 93-94 (citing In re Reexamination of the Commission's Cross-Interest
Policy, 4 F.C.C.R. 2208 (1989)). By contrast, today's time brokers usually supply pro-
grams to a station for most of a broadcast week, and are frequently contemplating a
purchase of the brokered station. Id. at 97-98 (survey of time brokerage contracts recently
filed with FCC shows that broker usually provides programming for majority of broadcast
day); id. at 97 (in 13 of 20 randomly surveyed brokerage contracts, broker either planned
to buy brokered station, had option to purchase brokered station, or had right of first
refusal).
5. See David M. Hunsaker, Duopoly Wars: Analysis and Case Studies of the FCC's
Radio Contour Overlap Rules, 2 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 21, 23 (1994) (using terms
"brokered station" and "brokering station").
6. See Julie A. Zier, FCC Says Radio LMAs, Duopolies On The Rise, BROADCASTING
& CABLE, Oct. 24, 1994, at 15, 15 (noting that the majority of LMAs are part of broader
station purchase agreements).
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programming, advertising sales forces and other facilities, thereby
reducing station expenses and enabling the weaker station to cut its
overhead and survive. As of early 1995, about three dozen time
brokerage agreements involve television stations8 and approximate-
ly 300 involve radio stations. 9
The Federal Communications Commission (the "FCC" or the
"Commission") has reviewed time brokerage agreements to ensure
that such agreements do not violate § 310(d) of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934.'0 This statute provides that no license or con-
struction permit may be "transferred, assigned, or disposed of in
any manner, voluntarily or involuntarily, directly or indirectly, or
by transfer of control of any corporation holding such permit or
license, to any person except upon application to the Commission
.... "1 Thus, a time brokerage agreement which gives brokers
"too much" control over a station violates § 310(d) by transferring
control over the brokered station without prior FCC permission.
The FCC has upheld the majority of time brokerage agreements it
has reviewed;12 however, the FCC occasionally has held that time
7. See Hunsaker, supra note 5, at 23-25 (pointing out efficiencies caused by time
brokerage, such as reduced expenses due to joint operation); Steve McClellan, Making
Most of Duopolies, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Apr. 17, 1995 at 50, 51 (discussing an
LMA which allowed station to combine two stations' 10-member sales teams into one 14-
member team that sold advertising for both stations); Steve McClellan & Dave Tobenkin,
Broadcasters Battle Over LMAs, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Feb. 6, 1995, at 8, 8 (describ-
ing how one television station increased ratings because of "on-air promotion blitz" from
competitor which was brokering station).
8. Steve McClellan, As LMAs Grow, So Do Concerns, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
June 5, 1995, at 8, 8.
9. Zier, supra note 6, at 15.
10. 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). In this Article, the term "FCC" or
"Commission" generally refers to the Commission as a whole (including its bureaus, the
Review Board, and administrative law judges) while the term "full Commission" refers
only to the Commission itself.
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., In re American Music Radio, No. BALCT-930210ED, 1995 FCC
LEXIS 5460 (July 31, 1995); In re WGPR, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8140 (F.C.C. 1995) (discuss-
,ing validity of LMA in particular detail); Paramount, No. 1800EI-AL, slip op.; Letter
from Barbara A. Kreisman, Chief, Video Services Division, to Piney Creek Broadcasting
Corp. & Lewis Broadcasting Corp., No. BALCT-940429KE, slip op. at 4 (M. Med. Bur.
Feb. 7, 1995); Letter from Larry D. Eads, Chief, Audio Services Div., to William L.
Silva, Esq., 9 F.C.C.R. 6155 (M. Med. Bur. 1994) (discussing control issue in two para-
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brokerage agreements or their implementation violated § 310(d) by
giving brokers an inordinate amount of control 3 over the brokered
graphs); Letter from Larry D. Eads, Chief, Audio Services Div., to Marvin Rosenberg,
Esq., 8 F.C.C.R. 5568 (M. Med. Bur. 1993); In re Bryant Communications, Inc., 6
F.C.C.R. 6121 (M. Med. Bur. 1991); Letter from Roy J. Stewart, Chief, Mass Media
Bureau, to Gisela Huberman, Esq., 6 F.C.C.R. 5397 (M. Med. Bur. 1991); Letter from
Roy J. Stewart, Chief, Mass Media Bureau, to Brian M. Madden, Esq., 6 F.C.C.R. 1871
(M. Med. Bur. 1991); Letter from Roy J. Stewart, Chief, Mass Media Bureau, to Peter D.
O'Connell, Esq., 6 F.C.C.R. 1869 (M. Med. Bur. 1991); Letter from Roy J. Stewart,
Chief, Mass Media Bureau, to J. Dominic Monahan, Esq., 6 F.C.C.R. 1867 (1991); Letter
from Roy J. Stewart, Chief, Mass Media Bureau, to Roy R. Russo, Esq., 5 F.C.C.R. 7586
(M. Med. Bur. 1990); Letter from Edythe Wise, Chief, Complaints & Investigations
Branch, Enforcement Div., to Joseph A. Belisle, Esq., 5 F.C.C.R. 7585 (M. Med. Bur.
1990); In re Broadcast Communications, Inc., 93 F.C.C.2d 1162 (Rev. Bd. 1983) (unusu-
ally brief discussion), aff'd in relevant part, 97 F.C.C.2d 61 (1984), aff'd, 759 F.2d 959
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985); see also Letter from Edythe Wise, Chief,
Complaints & Investigations Branch, Enforcement Div., to Michael R. Birdsill, 7 F.C.C.R.
7891 (1992) (discussing related issue of whether staff sharing between brokered and
brokering stations violated FCC's "main studio rule," which, among other things, requires
both stations to have full-time management employee).
13. See, e.g., Letter from Roy J. Stewart, Chief, Mass Media Bureau, to Bruce E.
Rosenblum, Esq., No. 8210-AJZ, slip op. at 2 (M. Med. Bur. 1995); see also Letter from
Roy J. Stewart, Chief, Mass Media Bureau, to Robert W. Larson, FM Broadcasters of
Douglas County, 10 F.C.C.R. .8254 (M. Med. Bur. 1995) (fining licensee where FCC's
Mass Media Bureau found unauthorized transfer of control); Letter from Roy J. Stewart,
Chief, Mass Media Bureau, to Patrick Markham, President, Brooke Communications, Inc.,
10 F.C.C.R. 8249 (M. Med. Bur. 1995) (fining broker in Larson); In re CanXus Broad-
casting Corp., 8 F.C.C.R. 4323 (M. Med. Bur. 1993)(rejecting time brokerage agreement);
In re Fresno FM Ltd. Partnership, 6 F.C.C.R. 1570 (Rev. Bd. 1991) aff'g In re Carta
Corp., 4 F.C.C.R. 7973 (ALJ 1989) (disqualifying broadcaster who was party to time
brokerage agreement).
Also worth noting are several cases in which a licensee's transfer of control to a
programmer was so egregious that the FCC (and in some cases, the parties themselves)
described the arrangement as a "lease" rather than a "time brokerage agreement." See
Letter from Roy J. Stewart, Chief, Mass Media Bureau, to Weston Properties XVIII Ltd.
Partnership, 8 F.C.C.R. 1783, 1785 (1993) (describing "Management Agreement" as
invalid "lease" where manager "collected all the revenues, paid all the expenses, selected
all the programming, and hired the employees, if any"); In re Benito Rish, 7 F.C.C.R.
6036 (1992), aff'd with reduced fine, 10 F.C.C.R. 2861 (F.C.C. 1995) (agreement violated
§ 310(d) where parties termed it a "lease," and licensee merely a landlord who contacted
lessee's president only to collect rental payments); Letter from Roy J. Stewart, Chief,
Mass Media Bureau, to Salem Broadcasting, Inc., 6 F.C.C.R. 4172, 4173 (M. Med. Bur.
1991) (invalidating contract labeled "Lease and Option Agreement" because licensee "that
relegates its role to that of a lessor, retaining merely the right to choose a general format
and a lessee to run the station, violates section 310(d)") (citation omitted); see also Mem-
1995]
6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
station.
Because of the efficiencies resulting from time brokerage, 14 the
survival and financial prosperity of hundreds of broadcast stations
hinges on the FCC's treatment of time brokerage. But rather than
drafting clear rules governing time brokerage, the FCC makes "de-
terminations regarding a licensee's retention of control of its time
brokered station ... on a case-by-case basis."'15 The FCC's deci-
sions, however, have been inconsistent at times. For example, it
is not clear whether the FCC supports or opposes time brokerage
agreements which give the broker an option to purchase the
brokered station. 16 Even those FCC cases which do not contradict
other FCC cases do not provide attorneys with much guidance,
since the FCC usually cites several factors to support its decision
without explaining which factors are crucial to the determination. 7
For example, in a letter to Bruce E. Rosenblum, Esquire, 8 the FCC
listed several contract provisions which supported its decision that
a licensee had abdicated control of station finances to a broker,
without explaining which provisions were most important. 9 Since
the FCC's decisions are so narrowly drawn, broadcasters have been
orandum, Brian M. Madden, LMAs and FCC Enforcement: Can You Find The Line
Before It's Too Late? at 2, 4 (Sept. 1995) [hereinafter "Memorandum"] (memorandum
distributed at National Association of Broadcasters Radio Show describing "lease" cases
in context of discussion of time brokerage).
Finally, some older cases have held that licensees failed to adequately monitor
brokers who broadcast foreign language programming. See, e.g., In re Cosmopolitan
Broadcasting Corp., 59 F.C.C.2d 558, reconsideration denied, 61 F.C.C.2d 257 (F.C.C.
1976), rev'd in part on other grounds, 581 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1978), on remand, 79
F.C.C.2d 16 (F.C.C. 1980); In re Notification to Sierra Madre Broadcasting Co., 47
F.C.C.2d 424 (F.C.C. 1974); In re Trans America Broadcasting Corp., 33 F.C.C.2d 606
(F.C.C. 1970). However, most of the "foreign language" cases involve narrow issues
which are inapplicable to other time brokerage agreements, and are accordingly beyond
the scope of this Article.
14. See Hunsaker, supra note 5, at 23; see also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
15. In re Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, 7 F.C.C.R. 6387, 6401 (1994).
16. See infra part II.A.4.
17. See, e.g., Larson, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8255-56 (citing several factors); Rosenblum, No.
8210-AJZ, slip op. at 3-4 (listing factors relevant to broker's control of station finances).
18. Letter from Roy J. Stewart, Chief, Mass Media Bureau, to Bruce E. Rosenblum,
Esq., No. 8210-AJZ, slip op. (M. Med. Bur. 1995).
19. Id. at 3-4.
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forced to draft and implement time brokerage agreements without
knowing where the FCC stands on many issues.
The purpose of this Article is twofold. First, by surveying FCC
case law regarding time brokerage, this Article may make it easier
for attorneys to draft contracts that will survive FCC scrutiny.
Specifically, this Article discusses FCC precedent regarding the
broker's appropriate roles in the finances, personnel, and program-
ming of the brokered station, as well as the broker's involvement
in other matters that cannot easily be placed in one of these catego-
ries. Second, this Article proposes that the FCC promulgate rules
regarding time brokerage. Such rules should specifically list at
least some of the factors which the FCC would consider in time
brokerage cases interpreting § 310(d).
Part I of this Article discusses the history of the FCC, the pro-
cedural context of recent time brokerage cases, and the gradual
liberalization of FCC time brokerage policy. Part II analyzes FCC
case law in detail and describes the factors the FCC has relied
upon in deciding whether to uphold or reject time brokerage agree-
ments. Part III contends that the FCC should adopt a rule govern-
ing time brokerage, because continued FCC reliance on adjudica-
tion does not give broadcasters or their attorneys sufficient guid-
ance to comply with the law, and no longer serves the FCC's origi-
nal rationale for case-by-case adjudication. Finally, part IV sum-
marizes FCC case law and highlights those areas that should be
addressed by a new rule.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Procedural Context
In 1934, Congress enacted the Communications Act2° which
created the Federal Communications Commission.2 ' Since 1934,
20. 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
21. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (creating FCC "[flor the purpose of regulating interstate and
foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio"); see also ERWIN G. KRASNOW,
ET AL., THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 10-15 (3d ed. 1982) (describing
government's pre-1934 attempts to regulate radio).
1995]
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the FCC has regulated radio and television stations,22 as well as
numerous other industries. 23 The FCC's regulatory authority over
broadcasters encompasses a wide variety of matters, including the
right to license radio and television stations,24 the right to veto
assignment of stations,25 and the right to issue declaratory rulings.26
The FCC has delegated much of its authority to its bureaus, includ-
ing its Mass Media Bureau (the "Bureau"). FCC regulations re-
quire the Bureau to administer policies relating to the regulation
and development of radio and television services.27 For example,
the Bureau initially reviews applications for radio and television
licenses, applications for license renewal, and applications for the
sale of stations.28 Parties disadvantaged by Bureau rulings may
appeal them to the full Commission.29
Where a broadcast application presents a substantial and materi-
al question of fact, the FCC will designate the application for a
hearing. 30 Such hearings are generally conducted before an admin-
istrative law judge ("AL") rather than the Bureau. 3' ALJs' deci-
sions are reviewed by a Review Board,32 and the Review Board's
22. See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (portion of Communications Act
governing broadcasting); Krasnow et. al., supra note 21, at 176-82 (describing early FCC
regulation of television).
23. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 11 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (describing FCC power over
telegraph industry); §§ 201-226 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (governing FCC regulation of
common carriers); §§ 531-559 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (governing FCC regulation of
cable television); § 721(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (describing FCC regulation of satel-
lites).
24. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307-309 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
25. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3540(a) (1994).
26. 47 C.F.R. § 1.2 (1994).
27. 47 C.F.R. § 0.61 (1994).
28. 47 C.F.R. § 0.61(a) and (c).
29. 47 C.F.R. § 0.283(b)(3)(1994) (providing that Commission handles applications
for review of Bureau decisions).
30. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.3591(a), 73.3593 (1994).
31. See 47 C.F.R. § 0.151 (1994) (providing that administrative law judges will
conduct all adjudicatory cases designated for hearing unless the FCC decides to hold
hearing en banc).
32. 47 C.F.R § 0.361(a) (1994). It should be noted, however, that the Commission
recently abolished the Review Board, effective March 29, 1996. See In re Elimination
of the Review Board, F.C.C. 96-4 (F.C.C. Jan. 23, 1996). After March 1996, the ALJ
decisions will be appealed directly to the Commission. See id.
[Vol. 6:1
TIME BROKERAGE AGREEMENTS
decisions may be reviewed by the Commission.33
The Bureau and its branches34 have usually addressed time
brokerage in the following contexts:
1. Evaluation of an application to assign a station license to a
time broker. In such situations, a third party (usually another
broadcaster) objected to a station sale on the ground that the broker
had already assumed premature control of the station through the
time brokerage agreement.
35
2. Requests for a declaratory ruling by the parties to a time
brokerage agreement.36
3. Attempts to fine licensees for transferring control of a sta-
tion to a broker without FCC authorization.37
B. The Rise of Time Brokerage
Time brokerage agreements have existed for decades; in fact,
33. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.1 15(b)(5) (1994) (listing grounds for review of Review Board
decision).
34. Assignment applications are typically addressed by the chief of the Bureau's
Audio Services or Video Services Division. See, e.g., Paramount, No. 1800El-AL, slip
op. at 14; Silva, 9 F.C.C.R. at 6160; Rosenberg, 8 F.C.C.R. at 5571; Bryant, 6 F.C.C.R.
at 6125. By contrast, requests for declaratory rulings and fines are typically addressed
by the Bureau Chief. See, e.g., Larson, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8257; Rosenblum, No. 8210-AJ,
slip op. at 5; CanXus, 8 F.C.C.R. at 4324; Huberman, 6 F.C.C.R. at 5398; Madden, 6
F.C.C.R. at 1872; O'Connell, 6 F.C.C.R. at 1870; Monahan, 6 F.C.C.R. at 1868. But cf.
Birdsill, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7891 (request for declaratory ruling delegated to Bureau's Com-
plaints and Investigations Branch); Belisle, 5 F.C.C.R. at 7585 (same).
ALJs and the Review Board have resolved few recent time brokerage cases, because
time brokerage cases tend to involve legal rather than factual controversies. But see
Fresno FM Ltd. Partnership, 6 F.C.C.R. at 1573 (Review Board decision on time broker-
age).
35. See Silva, 9 F.C.C.R. at 6156-58 (rejecting claim that time broker\proposed
assignee of station had prematurely assumed control over station through time brokerage);
Rosenberg, 8 F.C.C.R. at 5569-70 (same); Bryant, 6 F.C.C.R. at 6122-23 (same). In all
three cases, the objecting party was a broadcaster. In WGPR, the full Commission reject-
ed a similar argument made by a minority-owned corporation complaining about the sale
of a minority-owned station to CBS (which had previously entered into an LMA with the
seller). WGPR, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8140.
36. See, e.g., Rosenblum, No. 8210-AJZ, slip op. at 1; Huberman, 6 F.C.C.R. at
5397; Madden, 6 F.C.C.R. at 1871; O'Connell, 6 F.C.C.R. at 1869; Monahan, 6 F.C.C.R.
at 1867.
37. See Larson, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8256; CanXus, 8 F.C.C.R. at 4323.
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brokered foreign language programs were common in large markets
even before passage of the 1934 Communications Act.38
Time brokerage was traditionally used to provide specialized
programming, including foreign language programming.39 Under
such agreements, time brokers typically provided only a few hours
of specialized programming per week.40 Despite the limited extent
of time brokerage, the FCC had occasionally "expressed concern
that extensive time brokering might constitute an improper delega-
tion of control by the licensee to the broker.'
In 1945, the Commission adopted the first rule pertaining to
time brokerage. The Commission did not limit the amount of time
that could be sold to time brokers, but required radio licensees to
file time brokerage agreements with the Commission.42
In 1980, the FCC issued a policy statement regarding time
brokerage which stated that "time brokerage has the potential to
notably increase available program alternatives. Accordingly, we
have decided to encourage time brokerage. 43  Specifically, the
38. In re Petition for Issuance of Policy Statement or Notice of Inquiry on Part-Time
Programming, 82 F.C.C.2d 107, 108 (1980).
39. Id. at 108-10.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 108 (citing In re Filing of Agreements Involving the Sale of Broadcast
Time for Resale, 33 F.C.C.2d 653 (1972)); see also Sierra, 47 F.C.C.2d at 428 (licensee
exercised inadequate control over foreign language time broker); Trans America, 33
F.C.C.2d at 617 (licensee's control over foreign language programs "was informal and
inconsistent at best. At its worst it was non-existent."); Sewell, supra note 4, at 90-92
(describing numerous other pre-1980 FCC adjudications). Such delegations would be
"improper" because § 310(d) of the Communications Act prohibits licensees from trans-
ferring control over a station without prior FCC approval. See 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1988).
42. See Sewell, supra note 4, at 91 (citations omitted). FCC rules still require radio
licensees to file certain time brokerage agreements with the Commission. See Revision,
7 F.C.C.R. at 6402 (retaining requirement for "time brokerage agreement that would result
in the arrangement being counted in determining the brokering licensee's compliance with
local and national multiple ownership rules" and providing that all time brokerage agree-
ments involving radio stations must be kept in station files and made available for public
inspection). Brokerage agreements involving television stations need not be filed with the
FCC, but must be kept in station files and made available for FCC inspection. See 47
C.F.R. § 73.3613(e).
43. In re Petition for Issuance of Policy Statement or Notice of Inquiry on Part-Time
Programming, 82 F.C.C.2d 107, 108.
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FCC asserted that it would consider, at the licensee's request, a
time broker's affirmative action efforts4 and whether brokers could
establish lower political advertising rates for brokered licensees if
there were "significant differences in available audience levels '
45
between brokered and non-brokered programming.46 However, the
FCC did not address the question of when a broker's influence over
a station was sufficient to constitute a transfer of control to the
broker under § 310(d) of the Communications Act,47 which prohib-
its a licensee from transferring control of a broadcast station with-
out FCC permission.48
Shortly thereafter, another FCC policy change unintentionally
caused time brokerage to mushroom. During the 1980s, the FCC
adopted a number of policies which significantly increased the
number of commercial radio frequencies on both AM and FM ra-
dio.49 In the Clear Channel50 proceeding, the FCC reduced some
stations' protection from interference in order to create spectrum
space for smaller stations.5' For example, the FCC limited the ser-
vice range of the 25 strongest AM stations in order to make room
for about 100 additional AM stations.52 In another proceeding, the
44. Id. at 115.
45. Id. at 117. The FCC, however, did not state how much smaller a program's
audience must be in order to be "significantly" smaller for purposes of political advertis-
ing rules.
46. Id. at 116-17. 47 U.S.C. § 315 requires licensees to offer advertising rates to all
political candidates at the lowest charge for similar commercial time. 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993). Under prior law, the broker's charges were considered in deter-
mining the licensee's "lowest unit charge." Id. at § 315(b)(1). Thus, a brokered licensee,
would be required to match the broker's charges to comply with § 315. As a result,
before the policy statement was issued "licensees [were] therefore likely to restrict the
rates at which time brokers [could] sell political time ...[and] candidates for public
office tend[ed] to shy away from brokered programs where the advertising rate they must
pay [could] be out of line with the often limited audience to which the program is direct-
ed." Petition for Issuance of Policy Statement, 82 F.C.C.R. at 116.
47. 47 U.S.C. § 310(d).
48. Id.
49. See Hunsaker, supra note 5, at.21-22.
50. In re Clear Channel Broadcasting in the AM Broadcast Band, 78 F.C.C.2d 1345
(1980).
51. Id. at 1347.
52. Id. at 1346-47.
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FCC added over 700 new FM channels throughout the United
States.53 As a result of the growth of the number of stations, by
1991 "more than half of all commercial radio stations were operat-
ing in the red. 54
In order to save their stations, many licensees entered into time
brokerage agreements which dramatically differed from the time
brokerage agreements of the 1950s and 1960s. Instead of giving
a broker a few hours a week, many 1990s agreements allowed the
broker to "purchase 100% of the available broadcast time from the
other station for a flat monthly fee, and act as the programmer and
sales representative for that station."55 While 1960s time brokers
were often small ethnic broadcasters, 1990s time brokers often have
been prospective purchasers, and many 1990s agreements have
given the broker an option to purchase the brokered station.56 Time
brokerage arguably has saved weak television and radio stations by
allowing them to jointly operate facilities with other stations and
thereby reduce expenses.
Before 1989, "it was widely assumed that the type of agreement
.. which provided for the brokering of a substantial portion of a
station's time, would violate section 310(d) of the Communications
Act and attendant FCC policies. ' 8 In 1989, however, the FCC
repealed its prohibition against "one station brokering time on an-
other station in the same market." 59 Shortly thereafter, the FCC
53. Hunsaker, supra note 5, at 22 (citing In re Modification of FM Broadcast Station
Rules to Increase the Availability of Commercial FM Broadcast Assignments, 94 F.C.C.2d
152 (1983)).
54. Id. (citing In re Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, 7 F.C.C.R. 2755, reconsid-
eration granted in part, 7 F.C.C.R. 6387 (1992).
55. Id. at 23; see also in re Petition for Issuance of Interpretive Ruling Concerning
FCC Form 395-B, Broadcast Annual Employment Report, 9 F.C.C.R. 2535, 2536
(1994)(while pre-1980 time brokerage agreements "involved the brokerage by non-licens-
ees of short, discrete periods of broadcast time," more recent agreements usually involve
"large blocks of time or the entire programming schedule of a station to be brokered").
56. Hunsaker, supra note 5, at 23.
57. Id. at 25 (noting "sizeable savings that could stem from joint operation of same-
market radio facilities").
58. Id. at 23.
59. Sewell, supra note 4, at 93-94 (citing In re Reexamination of the Commission's
Cross-Interest Policy, 4 F.C.C.R. 2208, 2214). The rationale for this prohibition was that
such time brokerage agreements created a "potential for diminution of competition arising
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staff began to approve "modem" LMAs.6° For example, in Russo,6'
the Bureau upheld a time brokerage agreement involving competing
stations even though the agreement provided that the broker would
program 20 hours per day of programming and have an option to
purchase the brokered station.62 The Bureau found that the licensee
had retained control of its station because, among other factors, it
had "(1) 'retained its management personnel, including its General
Manager, Business Manager, Traffic Director, Executive Secretary,
and Chief Engineer' ... (2) retained, by written contract, full au-
thority over programming and personnel ... and (3) retained con-
trol over station financing, leaving the broker merely the ordinary
'profit of advertising revenues over brokerage fee.' ' 63 The FCC
also noted that the LMA provided that the brokered licensee would
have full authority over the station, including the right to reject or
preempt programming and advertisements and the right to supervise
all personnel through its General Manager and Chief Engineer.64
After Russo, brokered licensees have been able to obtain nearly
all of their programming from time brokers.65 Not surprisingly,
over the past five years, the FCC has approved more time broker-
age agreements 66 than it has rejected.67
from [a broadcaster] owning and programming one station and making programming
decisions at an independently-owned station." Cross Interest Policy, 4 F.C.C.R. at 2209.
The FCC decided that this rationale no longer made sense due to "[tihe substantial in-
crease in media outlets, and the corresponding increase in diversity and competition," id.
at 2214, and the likelihood that "[c]ompetitive conditions [will] require a station that
decides to broker its time to another to remain alert to the needs of its audience or risk
losing'some of that audience to a competitor." Id.
60. See Sewell, supra note 4, at 94-95 (describing major cases).
61. Letter from Roy J. Stewart, Chief, Mass Media Bureau, to Roy R. Russo, Esq.
5 F.C.C.R. 7586 (1990).
62. Id. at 7586-87. Although the Bureau approved two reciprocal agreements, much
of its opinion referred to the agreement in which the allegedly "controlling" licensee was
the broker and the allegedly "controlled" licensee was brokered. Id.
63. Fresno, 6 F.C.C.R. at 1572 (citations omitted) (describing, and partially quoting,
Russo, 5 F.C.C.R. at 7588).
64. Russo, 5 F.C.C.R. at 7587.
65. See Sewell, supra note 4, at 98.
66. See supra note 12 (listing cases in which FCC approved time brokerage agree-
ments).
67. See supra note 13 (listing cases in which FCC has disapproved of time brokerage
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The FCC, however, has declined to adopt any broad rules gov-
erning time brokerage on the ground that the question of whether
a licensee has "lost control" over a station is one that is most ap-
propriately addressed on a case-by-case basis. 68 Under this "case-
by-case" inquiry, the FCC will typically address the extent of the
broker's control over the brokered station's finances, personnel, and
programming. 69 If the broker rather than the brokered licensee con-
trols station finances, personnel or programming, the licensee has
violated § 3 10(d) by transferring control of its station without FCC
permission."
II. THE FCC's LIKES AND DISLIKES
In order to comply with § 310(d) of the Communications Act,
a licensee must retain ultimate control over station personnel, pro-
gramming and finances. 7' However, a licensee may delegate day-
to-day control over all three areas, as long as the licensee continues
to set policies guiding station operations.72 Although contract terms
may be relevant, provisions that "purport to retain control in the
agreements).
68. Revision I, 7 F.C.C.R. at 6401 (1992). This author notes, however, that the FCC
has adopted general rules governing the impact of time brokerage agreements upon FCC
ownership restrictions. See, e.g., In re Revision of Radio Rules and Policies: Second
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 7183, 7191-93 (1994) [hereinafter Revision
I] (addressing validity of time brokerage agreements between licensees of two stations
in same market under FCC rules limiting the number of stations a person or entity may
own). Time brokerage agreements between stations in the same market must certify in
writing that the licensee of the brokered station "maintains ultimate control over the sta-
tion's facilities, including specifically control over station finances, personnel and pro-
gramming." 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(a)(2)(ii) (1994).
69. WGPR, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8141.
70. See 47 U.S.C. § 310(d)(requiring FCC consent for transfer of control over sta-
tion); Rosenberg, 8 F.C.C.R. at 5570 (to comply with § 310(d), a licensee "must retain
ultimate responsibility over all station matters involving personnel, programming and
finances") (citations omitted).
71. Rosenberg, 8 F.C.C.R. at 5570. In fact, time brokerage agreements between
licensees of nearby radio stations, in which brokers own 15% or more of the brokered
station's time, must explicitly provide that the brokered licensee "maintains ultimate
control over the station's facilities, including specifically control over station finances,
personnel and programming." 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(a)(2)(ii).
72. See WGPR, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8142.
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licensee, if not actually exercised, will not ensure protection where
the FCC believes that the totality of the circumstances indicate that
there has been an unauthorized transfer of control. 73
Part II.A surveys FCC case law defining licensee control of
station finances. As a rule, a licensee controls station finances if
it is responsible for most station expenses. 74 Conversely, a licensee
has abdicated control if the broker pays for usual station expenses
such as insurance, utilities, taxes 75 and FCC fines. 76 FCC case law
is somewhat more ambiguous as to other finance-related issues,
such as joint sales arrangements77 and option contracts.78
Part II.B addresses the question of when a brokered licensee
controls station personnel. Generally, a licensee controls station
personnel if a time brokerage agreement so provides 79 and where
the licensee has a significant role in the hiring and compensation
of station personnel.80  By contrast, the FCC has found generally
that licensees who terminate all their employees after entering into
73. Memorandum, supra note 13, at 2; see also Fresno, 6 F.C.C.R. at 1572 (contrac-
tual assertion of licensee control over programming outweighed by licensee's failure to
effectively implement provision).
74. See, e.g., Rosenberg, 8 F.C.C.R. at 5570 (upholding LMA where licensee paid
all station costs except for those associated with production and delivery of programs
supplied by broker).
75. See Rosenblum, No. 8210-AJZ, slip op. at 3-4 (holding that broker controlled
station where the broker paid insurance, utilities, and numerous other station expenses).
76. See Fresno, 6 F.C.C.R. at 1572.
77. See Huberman, 6 F.C.C.R. at 5397-98 (upholding LMA involving joint sales
arrangement); Carta, 4 F.C.C.R. at 7983 (holding that brokered licensee abdicated control
over station where broker's principals negotiated joint sales effort between brokered
station and third station).
78. See Russo, 5 F.C.C.R. at 7586-87 (upholding LMA where broker had option to
purchase station); Larson, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8255 (unfavorably noting that broker had option
to purchase brokered station).
79. See, e.g., Russo, 5 F.C.C.R. at 7587 (upholding LMA providing that all personnel
shall be subject to supervision and direction of station's General Manager and/or Chief
Engineer).
80. See, e.g., Paramount, No. 1800E1-AL, slip op. at 9 (upholding LMA where
broker is responsible for costs associated with personnel used in the sale of advertising
time and the production of broker's programming, but licensee pays salaries and related
costs for other station personnel); Silva, 9 F.C.C.R.' at 6158 (upholding LMA where all
employees hired with licensee's approval).
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an LMA have abdicated control over station personnel.8'
Part II.C confronts the question of when a brokered licensee
controls station programming. At a minimum, the licensee must air
announcements identifying its station, maintain its own main stu-
dio, maintain its own file for public inspection, cover local commu-
nity issues or ensure that the broker does, and comply with the
FCC's political programming rules or ensure the broker's compli-
ance.8 2 A time brokerage agreement is also more likely to obtain
FCC approval if it gives the licensee the right to monitor program-
ming8 3 and the right to preempt programs at will. 4
Finally, Part II.D covers miscellaneous station management
issues that cannot easily be placed into the previously addressed
categories, such as contract provisions giving the broker veto power
over station sales, restricting the brokered licensee's right to termi-
nate a time brokerage agreement, and assessing liquidated damages
for breach of contract.8 5
A. Finances
1. Generally
A time brokerage agreement should explicitly state that a li-
censee is responsible for most station expenses, and the parties to
the agreement should honor such provisions.8 6 For example, in
Rosenberg,8 7 the Bureau upheld an LMA where 8 the licensee ap-
81. See, e.g., Larson, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8255 (rejecting LMA where licensee's employ-
ees switched onto broker's payroll, and most were later terminated); Carta, 4 F.C.C.R.
at 7982 (holding that broker controlled station where licensee retained no full-time em-
ployees).
82. See Bryant, 6 F.C.C.R. at 6123 (listing rules regarding LMAs); Huberman, 6
F.C.C.R. at 5398 (licensee must oversee broker's political programming practices);
Monahan, 6 F.C.C.R. at 1867-68 (licensee must continue to air own station identifications,
maintain its own main studio, and maintain its own public inspection file).
83. See Paramount, No. 1800EI-AL, slip op. at 8 (favorably citing LMA provision
requiring broker to give licensee notice of programming changes).
84. See Piney Creek, No. BALCT-940929KE, slip op. at 3; Rosenberg, 8 F.C.C.R.
at 5570.
85. See infra part I.D. (discussing these and other factors).
86. See Piney Creek, No. BALCT-940429KE, slip op. at 3 (upholding LMA which
provided that licensee would be "responsible for the station's daily expenses").
87. Letter from Larry D. Eads, Chief, Audio Services Div., to Marvin Rosenberg,
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parently "ha[d] control over all [of the station's operating costs]
... with the exception of those costs associated with program pro-
duction and delivery of the programming supplied by [the bro-
ker]."89
By contrast, in In the Matter of Liability of CanXus Broadcast-
ing Corporation9° the Bureau rejected a time brokerage agreement
which "provided for a substantial assumption of financial control
by [the broker] over advertising revenues, business expenses, con-
tractual obligations, and salaries."9' The Bureau did not, however,
specifically explain why the agreement gave the broker "substan-
tial' control. Thus, it is unclear how much broker control 'over
finances is "too much."
Although the Bureau's decisions have not been particularly
clear, it appears that in order to preclude FCC application of
CanXus, the drafters of a time brokerage agreement should include
Esq., 8 F.C.C.R. 5568 (M. Med. Bur. 1993).
88. Almost all of the decisions discussed below rely on more than one factor to
support the FCC's approval or rejection of a time brokerage agreement. For example, in
Rosenberg the Bureau relied not only on the licensee's control over its finances, but also
on the licensee's contentions that (1) the three employees vital to the operation of the
station were employees of the licensee rather than the broker, (2) the licensee retained the
right to preempt programs and (3) the licensee reserved six hours of programming for
itself. See Rosenberg, 8 F.C.C.R at 5570.
It follows that an LMA could contain some of the factors that ordinarily support
approval of time brokerage agreements, but nevertheless be rejected by the FCC because
these factors were outweighed by others which indicate that the licensee had abdicated
control over its station. This Article only analyzes factors which the FCC appears to have
relied upon in endorsing or rejecting a time brokerage agreement. Accordingly, LMA
provisions cited in the "discussion" section of a decision will usually be analyzed below,
while LMA provisions which are merely cited at the start of a decision will not be ana-
lyzed, as there is no reason to believe that the FCC relied upon such provisions in its
decision-making process.
89. Rosenberg, 8 F.C.C.R. at 5570; see also American Music Radio, 1995 FCC
LEXIS 5460 at *7 (upholding LMA where licensee responsible for "payment of utilities,
maintenance, insurance and repair expenses, and equipment rental"); Bryant, 6 F.C.C.R.
at 6123 (upholding LMA where licensee's "finances are separate from [those of bro-
ker]"); Russo, 5 F.C.C.R. at 7587 (upholding time brokerage agreement because, inter
alia, broker's financial control limited to "the financial arrangement characteristic of time
brokerage arrangements-a profit of advertising revenues over brokerage fee").
90. 8 F;C.C.R. 4323 (M. Med. Bur. 1993).
91. Id.
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both general provisions that a licensee is responsible for station
expenses, and more specific clauses that support those provisions.
2. Paying the Licensee's Bills
A general provision that the licensee is responsible for station
expenses, although persuasive, is not dispositive if more specific
provisions prove that the broker dominates station finances. For
instance, in Rosenblum,92 the parties to a time brokerage agreement
requested a declaratory ruling regarding the agreement's validity.
The agreement provided that the licensee would be responsible for
all costs of station operation.93 Nevertheless, the Bureau found
that, for a wide variety of reasons, the agreement vested the broker
with an inordinate amount of control over station finances. 94 Spe-
cifically, the Bureau pointed out that the agreement required the
broker, rather than the licensee, to pay for the station's insurance,
utilities, and taxes. 95 Although the agreement required the licensee
to produce its own programming, the same agreement required the
broker to provide the production facilities, air talent, and engineer-
ing personnel for such programming.96 The agreement also required
the broker to reimburse the licensee for charges made by such
organizations as ASCAP and BMI, 97and for engineering costs in-
curred in applying to the FCC for a construction permit modifica-
tion.98 The agreement further provided that the broker must con-
struct, purchase, install, and retain ownership of new station equip-
ment and facilities. 99 For example, the agreement required the
broker to build a studio and studio-transmitter link for the licens-
92. No. 8210-AJZ, slip op. (1995); see also supra note 13.
93. Rosenblum, No. 8210-AJZ, slip op. at 3.
94. Id. at 2-3.
95. Id. at 3.
96. Id.
97. ASCAP and BMI sell "blanket licenses" to broadcasters. Such licenses allow the
broadcasters to use millions of copyrighted musical compositions. See Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1979) (describing organizations and their functions). If
ASCAP and BMI did not exist, individual copyright owners (i.e. musicians) would have
to negotiate with broadcasters themselves and try to individually detect unauthorized
performances of their work. Id.
98. Rosenblum, No. 8210-AJZ, slip op. at 3-4.
99. Id. at 4.
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ee.'0° Although the licensee was to pay the general manager's
salary, the station's FCC fines, and its FCC filing fees,1' these
factors were outweighed by the contract provisions which gave the
broker control over the station's other finances.
Rosenblum stands for the proposition that qualifying language
about control will not save a time brokerage agreement where the
agreement contains numerous provisions shifting financial responsi-
bility to a broker.1
02
In Rosenblum, the Bureau found that a wide variety of contrac-
tual provisions, considered as a whole, precluded a finding that the
licensee had retained control of its station. However, the Bureau
did not state that any one of the provisions was specifically forbid-
den. In contrast, the Review Board did exactly that in Fresno
where the licensee of a brokered station had applied, along with
several competing applicants, for a new station. The Fresno time
brokerage agreement provided that the broker would have to pay
any forfeiture assessed by the FCC for violations of FCC rules
arising from the broker's programming. 10 3 The Review Board de-
scribed this provision as "an abdication the FCC specifically for-
bade in its [policy statement] ... as plainly inconsistent with bed-
rock licensee accountability."' 104 Based on the forfeiture provision,
as well as the licensee's failure to retain contractual control over
station personnel and to engage in any systematic oversight over
programming, the Review Board deemed the licensee unqualified
to own another broadcast facility. 5
The Review Board's absolute prohibition on a broker's payment
of forfeitures has not been explicitly adopted by the full Commis-
sion or the Bureau, and may never be. In Fresno, the Review
Board stated that the broker's payment of FCC forfeitures was "an
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Cf. Memorandum, supra note 13, at 6 (even if broker reimburses licensee for
expenses, licensee should make initial payments).
103. Fresno, 6 F.C.C.R. at 1572.
104. Id. (citation omitted).
105. Id.
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abdication the FCC specifically forbade"'1 in its 1980 policy state-
ment. In fact, the policy statement merely states that "licensees are
held ultimately responsible for the behavior of their independent
producers"' 07 -a significantly less conclusive statement. Never-
theless, a licensee would be acting imprudently if it allowed the
broker to pay FCC forfeitures., °8
3. Joint Sales Arrangements
In Huberman,'°9 the parties to a time brokerage agreement re-
quested the FCC to issue a declaratory ruling approving the agree-
ment. The agreement in question provided that the broker could
sell advertising in combination for its own station and for the li-,
censee's station.11 0 The Bureau found that as the Commission had
eliminated its prohibition on joint sales practices several years
earlier, there was no reason to suspect that the joint sales arrange-
ment would give the broker control over station operations."' In
contrast, the ALJ in Carta found that a licensee's willingness to
allow the broker's principals.. 2 to negotiate a joint sales effort in-
volving the brokered station and another radio station was evidence
that the licensee had allowed the broker to assume control over
station operations.' 3 However, the ALJ did not explain why such
negotiations were so incriminating.
Although neither Huberman nor Carta explained the difference
between a broker/licensee joint sales effort and a broker/third par-
ty/licensee joint sales effort in which the licensee takes no part in
negotiations, the difference between the two situations appears
obvious: in the first case, the licensee negotiates the joint sales
106. Id. (citation omitted).
107. Petition for Issuance of Policy Statement, 82 F.C.C.2d at 113.
108. See Memorandum, supra note 13, at 8 (making similar point).
109. Letter from Roy J. Stewart, Chief, Mass Media Bureau, to Gisela Huberman,
Esq., 6 F.C.C.R. 5397 (M. Med. Bur. 1991).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. The negotiations in question were apparently conducted by Elias DeAlba, who
owned, in 1987, 40% of the broker. See Carta, 4 F.C.C.R. at 7977-78. Furthermore, in
1988 DeAlba discussed "a joint sales effort between [the broker] ... and Station
KXEX(AM), Fresno." Id. at 79.83.
113. Carta, 4 F.C.C.R. at 7983; see also id. at 7980.
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effort on its own behalf, while in the second case, the licensee
allows the broker to negotiate for the licensee.
In Sum, the FCC does not object to joint sales agreements nego-
tiated between a broker and a licensee, but does object to joint
sales agreements negotiated by a broker for the licensee. Although
the FCC has not explained its reasoning, the latter arrangement
may not pass scrutiny because in a broker/licensee/third party situa-
tion, the licensee has essentially delegated its right to negotiate
contracts to the broker.
4. Options to Purchase A Station
In Russo, the Bureau upheld a time brokerage agreement de-
spite the fact that the broker acquired an option to purchase the
station for $14.5 million. Under the option agreement, the broker
was required to exercise the option within seven months or pay an
"option fee" of $2 million.114 The Bureau explained that the poten-
tial $2 million option fee was permissible because it did not repre-
sent a present investment of working capital in the station." 5
By contrast, in Larson a broker and a licensee entered into a
time brokerage agreement which was accompanied by "an 'Option
Agreement' for the purchase and sale of the station for $65,000.
... [T]his option was assigned by [the broker to a third party] ..
. which subsequently exercised it to initiate the assignment of li-
cense application later filed with the Commission."'"16 The Bureau
found that this time brokerage agreement constituted an unautho-
rized transfer of control, and set forth a number of "facts leading
to this conclusion.' 117 One of these facts was the option agreement
mentioned above." 8 The Bureau, however, made no effort to ex-
plain how the option agreement evidenced the broker's control of
the brokered station, nor did it make any effort to distinguish Russo
regarding this issue. Because the Bureau's discussion of the
114. Russo, 5 F.C.C.R. at 7586.
115. Id. at 7587; see also Piney Creek, No. BALCT-940429KE, slip op. at 3 (hold-
ing that option to buy "does not raise an issue of de facto control").
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Larson facts was quite lengthy,"9 the Bureau may have intended to
mention the option contract simply as background rather than as a
material factor supporting its decision.
However, in Carta, an ALJ condemned an option contract far
more explicitly. In the course of a decision finding that a licensee
had unlawfully transferred control of its station to a broker, the
ALJ stated that:
[a]nother factor of some significance is [the licensee's own-
er's] . . . option agreement with [the broker]. Under the
agreement executed in 1985, [the broker] ... was given the
option to purchase 15% of [licensee] . . . stock at the end
of any annual term of the Time Brokerage Contract. If [the
broker] ... had remained current in its payments to [the li-
censee] . . . it would have had the right to buy all of [the
licensee's] . . . stock in 1991. [The licensee's owner] is
still willing to sell stock to [the broker] . . . and he ex-
pressed a desire to sell the station. In fact, [the licensee's
owner] . . . and his daughter have established a trust ac-
count to satisfy the IRS that parts of the money received
from [the broker] . . . were for the purchase of stock. A
licensee's continued willingness to 'trade control of cash'
is relevant to determining whether a transfer of control has
taken place. 2°
Thus, FCC rulings involving option contracts have been incon-
sistent. In Larson, Carta, and Russo, an option agreement gave the
broker an option to purchase the brokered station from the licensee.
Yet the FCC disapproved of the option contract in the first two
cases, but not in the third. There is no obvious factual distinction
between the option contracts in the three cases; thus, the FCC's
vacillation between support of, and opposition to, option contracts
is extremely difficult to explain.
119. Id. at 8254-56 (discussion of facts relevant to control, programming and financ-
es took three pages and mentioned numerous factors).
120. Carta, 4 F.C.C.R. at 7983 (citation omitted).
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There are at least two possible explanations of the case law. If
the Larson decision mentioned the option contract as mere back-
ground information (as opposed to evidence of broker control),
Russo indicates that the Bureau does not oppose option contracts,
and that the Bureau simply disagrees with the Carta ALJ. By
contrast, if the Bureau intended to condemn option contracts in
Larson, Larson and Russo may well be irreconcilable, in which
case the law is completely unclear. The Bureau may have changed
its position on option contracts, or may have simply failed to notice
the inconsistency between its decisions.
5. Structuring the Transaction
In Paramount Stations Group of Kerrville, Inc.,121 a broker
originally entered into an option agreement which gave it the right
to buy a television station itself.12 2 The broker did not immediately
buy the station since it owned another station in the same market
(and, therefore, was barred from owning another station under FCC
rules).123 After learning that the FCC would not change its owner-
ship rules in the foreseeable future, the broker solicited another
broadcaster to buy the same station. 124 The buyer assumed the
option contract, exercised its right to buy the station, and entered
into a time brokerage agreement with the broker.125 The licensee
of a competing station challenged the transaction.
126
Specifically, the competitor reasoned that since the broker nego-
tiated the option and sales contracts, solicited the buyer to assume
those contracts, and unilaterally drafted the time brokerage agree-
ment, the broker rather than the buyer controlled the station.
27
The Bureau, however, upheld the transaction for three reasons.
First, the buyer was an experienced broadcaster. Thus, the facts
121. No. 1800EI-AL, slip. op. (M. Med. Bur. June 6, 1995).
122. Id. at 2.
123. Id. (noting that "existing rules" barred broker from owning two stations in same
market); see also 47 C.F.R. §73.3555(b) (providing that no party shall be licensed to
operate two television broadcast stations in same market).
124. Paramount, No. 1800E1-AL, slip op. at 2-3.
125. See id.
126. Id. at I (objections to agreements filed by San Antonio licensees).
127. Id. at 5.
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did not "resemble those [facts] in the line of cases where the nomi-
nal owners, neophytes in the field of broadcasting, are alleged to
have yielded their de jure control to experienced broadcasters as-
suming purportedly passive roles." 128 Second, "to find that a third
party's solicitation of a proposed licensee's participation in a given
transaction is demonstrative of control would unduly inhibit the
workings of the marketplace"'129 by prohibiting prospective buyers
from assigning their rights to anyone outside "the limited universe
of parties who themselves initiate such contacts."' 3 ° Third, the
broker's involvement in the station's sale was irrelevant because
the buyer was free to reject the broker's proposal, and the assignee
of a contract always steps into the position of the assignor. 3 '
Paramount, thus, stands for the proposition that the broker can
structure the sale of a station or an accompanying time brokerage
agreement by soliciting the buyer and drafting relevant agreements,
at least where the buyer is an experienced broadcaster and can
freely reject the broker's terms. However, Paramount also implies
that such active broker involvement may be inappropriate where
128. Id. at 6 (citations omitted). The Bureau cited three cases, none of which in-
volved time brokerage. In In re Evergreen Broadcasting Co., 6 F.C.C.R. 5599 (1991), the
FCC chose among numerous applicants for a new radio station. The FCC refused to
credit one applicant's claim that it should be awarded a construction permit because its
stockholders were "integrated" (i.e. planned to participate in the management of the sta-
tion) because several non-stockholders "will be in a position to exercise significant,
continuing control over the applicant." Id. at 5601. This conclusion was based upon
numerous factors, including the non-stockholders' "longstanding relationship with the
nominal owners (i.e. as husbands and close friends), their extensive broadcast experience,
their original interest in applying for the station, and their intention to resign their mana-
gerial jobs [at other stations] ... should [the applicant] prevail." Id. at 5601-02 (empha-
sis added). The other two cases cited in Paramount also involved the question of integra-
tion credit. See In re Royce Int'l Broadcasting, 5 F.C.C.R. 7063, 7064 (1990) (denying
integration credit to applicant's general partner because she was dominated by limited
partner, an experienced broadcaster); In re Applications of Metroplex Communications,
Inc., 5 F.C.C.R. 5610, 5611-12 (1990)(applicant's "organization was a sham designed to
artificially enhance [its] integration [claim]...It is not credible that a group of experienced
owners (including those with past broadcast ownership) would grant exclusive control of
their station to a virtual stranger with no broadcast experience").
129. Paramount, No. 1800E1-AL, slip op. at 6.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 6-7.
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the buyer is a neophyte in the broadcasting industry.
B. Personnel
1. Generally
As noted above, the distribution of power over personnel mat-
ters is among "the principal indicia of control."' 132 Applying this
rule, the Bureau has upheld a time brokerage agreement where the
licensee "will have broad discretion to make and effect all of the
station's staffing and personnel decisions and will be responsible
for the station's daily expenses."' 3 3 In addition, the Bureau has
upheld a time brokerage agreement which provided that "whenever
on the Station's premises, all personnel shall be subject to the su-
pervision and the direction of the [licensee's] General Manager
and/or Chief Engineer." 134 It follows that a time brokerage agree-
ment should provide that the licensee retains substantial power over
personnel decisions to help ensure FCC approval.
2. Payroll
In Silva,'35 a broadcaster sought to assign its construction permit
to its time broker, and a competitor1 36 objected on the grounds that
the broker already controlled the station. 37 The Bureau disagreed,
since "all payments made to the employees were drawn from [the
station's] account,"'38 including those made to employees hired by
the broker. However, the licensee need not pay all employment-
related expenses. For example, in Paramount the Bureau found
that the licensee had not abdicated control over station personnel
132. Russo, 5 F.C.C.R. at 7586.
133. Piney Creek, No. BALCT-940429KE, slip op. at 3.
134. Russo, 5 F.C.C.R. at 7587 (quoting Time Brokerage Agreement for Radio
Station WXDJ-FM, § 11; Time Brokerage Agreement for Radio Station WAQI-FM (now
WRTO), § 11).
135. Letter from Larry D. Eads, Chief, Audio Services Div., to William L. Silva,
Esq., (M. Med. Bur. 1994). 9 F.C.C.R. 6155.
136. See id. (noting that objection to assignment filed by licensee of radio station in
same city as brokered station).
137. Id. at 6156.
138. Id. at 6158. In Silva, as in other cases, the Bureau noted that the station's
incumbent owner also controlled station programming and could terminate the LMA at
will. Id.
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even though the LMA allowed the broker to pay the "costs associ-
ated with personnel used in the sale of commercial advertising time
and the production of [the broker's] programming."1 39 In sum, the
broker can pay personnel expenses closely related to the broker's
own programming, but should not be responsible for all payroll
expenses. The FCC, therefore, appears to have drawn a common-
sense line: expenses related solely to the broker's programs should
be borne by the broker, just as any program producer would pay its
own expenses before selling programs to a station. However, most
other expenses should be paid by the licensee.
3. Hiring
The FCC has been more likely to approve time brokerage
agreements where licensees, as opposed to brokers, hire or approve
the hiring of major station personnel. For example, the Bureau ap-
proved a time brokerage agreement where "all employees and
equipment utilized by [the broker] in its operation of [the station]
were hired or acquired with [the licensee's] 'approval.', 1 40  The
Bureau approved less intrusive time brokerage agreements in the
Rosenberg case, which held that the licensee retained control of a
station because, inter alia, the three employees vital to the opera-
tion of the station "remained in [the licensee's] employ,"' 4' and in
Bryant, where the Bureau found that the licensee's "station manag-
er and chief engineer maintain[ed] control of station operations."'' 42
Similarly, in Silva, the Bureau found that a licensee retained con-
trol over its station because when the broker was contacted "re-
139. Paramount, No. 1800E1-AL, slip op. at 9. However, the licensee was otherwise
"responsible for the salaries, taxes, insurance and related costs for all the station person-
nel." Id.
140. Silva, 9 F.C.C.R. at 6158.
141. Rosenberg, 8 F.C.C.R. at 5570; see also American Music Radio, 1995 FCC
Lexis 5460 at * 13 (upholding LMA where licensee's general partner was station's general
manager even after LMA executed); Paramount, No. 1800E1-AL, slip op. at 9 (approving
time brokerage agreement which required licensee to "'provide and be responsible' for
station personnel necessary for the broadcast transmission of programs and 'other aspects
of Station operation,' including, at minimum, the station's general manager and another
employee"); Russo, 5 F.C.C.R. at 7587 (upholding time brokerage agreement where
broker's principals were not involved in station management).
142. Bryant, 6 F.C.C.R. at 6123.
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garding an interference complaint, it was actually [the licensee's]
engineer, Roger Bennett, who resolved the problem."'43
The full Commission recently held that a broker may send em-
ployees to a station in order to implement an LMA. In WGPR,
Inc.,144 a broker sent an executive to the brokered station to "super-
intend [its] rights and obligations under the local marketing agree-
ment." 145 The full Commission nevertheless found that the licensee
controlled its own personnel since it retained all of its own employ-
ees, including key employees such as its general manager. 4
6
In contrast, the Bureau rejected a time brokerage agreement
where the licensee "terminated virtually all of its staff ' 147 after
entering into a time brokerage agreement. In Carta, the licensee
retained three part-time employees after entering into a time bro-
kerage agreement, but an ALJ nevertheless found that the licensee
had abdicated control because the employees were not present at
the station for most of the week, and major station employees such
as the general manager, sales manager, and program director were
part of the broker's staff.14 In sum, a licensee will probably be
able to establish that it controls station personnel if it hires major
station employees and approves the broker's employees, or if the
licensee's employees resolve major station problems. By contrast,
a time brokerage agreement is less likely to survive Commission
scrutiny if the licensee terminates most of its full-time staff after
entering into a time brokerage agreement.
4. Employee Sharing
The FCC has held that regardless of whether it is a party to a
time brokerage agreement, a licensee must "maintain a 'meaningful
143. Silva, 9 F.C.C.R. at 6158.
144. In re WGPR, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8140 (F.C.C. 1995).
145. Id. at 8143.
146. Id.
147. CanXus, 8 F.C.C.R. at 4323; see also Larson, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8255 (rejecting
LMA where licensee's employees switched from licensee payroll to .broker payroll, and
were later either terminated or forced into part-time employment); Memorandum, supra
note 13, at 9 (broker should not hire and fire licensee's employees).
148. Carta, 4 F.C.C.R. at 7982.
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management and staff presence' at its main studio."'149 For exam-
ple, in the case of Jones Eastern of the Outer Banks, Inc.,150 the
FCC held that a licensee violated the "main studio" rule because
its main studio was "staffed by only a full-time office worker who
took telephone calls and. . . [a] business manager and the general
manager [who] spent four and two unspecified hours per week,
respectively, at the studio."'1 5' In the same case, the FCC stated
that the licensee would have had a "meaningful managerial pres-
ence"152 at the studio if at least one management employee had
"report[ed] to work at the main studio on a daily basis."' 53 Man-
agement employees include presidents, corporate officers, general
managers, station managers, program directors, sales managers,
news directors, personnel managers, facilities managers, production
managers, research directors, controllers, promotion directors, and
chief accountants. 54 A chief engineer is "managerial" if he or she
has managerial duties other than serving as an engineer.
Brokered stations may have difficulty following the "meaning-
ful managerial presence" rule because brokered licensees are fre-
quently caught between time brokerage agreements prohibiting
them from airing a significant amount of programming and FCC
rules requiring them to have at least one full-time manager at the
station. For example, if a licensee airs only one hour of program-
ming per week, its needs will be minimal, and its owner may plau-
sibly believe that hiring multiple employees would be a waste of
money. 155
149. Petition for Reconstruction and/or Clarification of Jones Eastern of the Outer
Banks, Inc., 7 F.C.C.R. 6800, 6800 (1992), denying reconsideration of 6 F.C.C.R. 3615
(1991); see also 47 C.F.R. § 73.1125(a) (1994) (requiring licensees to maintain main
studio near city of license).
150. Jones, 7 F.C.C.R. at 6801-02.
151. Id.; see also Letter from Roy J. Stewart, Chief, Mass Media Bureau, to Salem
Broadcasting, Inc., 6 F.C.C.R. 4172 (1991) (station violated main studio rule where only
managerial employee was part-time).
152. Jones, 7 F.C.C.R. at 6801.
153. Id. at 6802.
154. Id. at 6801-02.
155. The case of In re Maines Broadcasting, Inc., 8 F.C.C.R. 5501 (1993) is some-
what analogous to situations involving time brokerage. In Maines, the licensee's main
studio had only one employee, not because of a time brokerage agreement, but because
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In Birdsill, a licensee tried to resolve this dilemma by sharing
employees with the broker. The licensee asked the Bureau "wheth-
er a brokered licensee may share staff with a brokering licensee
with which it shares a main studio."'56 The Bureau stated that the
two licensees could share staff so long as the brokered licensee's
employees were at the station during normal business hours and
continued to perform station functions during those hours.1 57 How-
ever, the Bureau added that the licensee and the broker could not
share management employees. 158
For example, in WGPR a licensee made available to the broker
"its employees engaged in sales, traffic and collection functions."'59
The full Commission nevertheless found that the licensee controlled
station personnel because: (1) the employees in question were com-
pensated by the licensee; and (2) the licensee also retained a gener-
al manager and a full-time employee to assist the general manag-
er."6 Thus, a licensee's full-time employees must be compensated
by the licensee rather than by the broker.
In sum, a brokered licensee's right to share employees with a
broker is not absolute. A licensee may allow its staff to perform
some work on the broker's behalf. However, the licensee must
retain its key management employees, and must continue to com-
most of its employees were at another studio (which was too far from the station's city
of license to be turned into the main studio under the main studio rule). The licensee
asked the FCC for a waiver of the main studio rule on the grounds that, among other
things, "the current personnel cost of maintaining the [main] studio with one staff member
is nearly $10,000 per year, and thus is a substantial burden for a station with monthly
revenues of $6,000-7,500." Id. The FCC rejected the waiver application, holding that
waivers of the main studio rule should be granted only where studio sites near the city
of license are unavailable. Id. at 5502.
Although Maines is not on point, it illustrates the fiscal difficulties stations can suffer
if they duplicate operations-in the Maines case by having two studios, in a typical LMA
situation by having "broker employees" and "licensee employees."
156. Birdsill, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7891.
157. Id. (citation omitted). The Bureau has also made it clear that a licensee's
employees' duties should include supervising the broker's employees when they are at the
licensee's station. See Paramount, No. 1800E1-AL, slip op. at 9.
158. Birdsill, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7891.
159. WGPR, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8143.
160. Id.
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pensate those employees.
C. Programming
1. Some Basic Requirements
The Bureau has repeatedly set forth the following requirements
for licensees of brokered stations:
a. The licensee must air announcements identifying the station.
b. The licensee must maintain its own main studio.
c. The licensee must maintain its own file for public inspec-
tion.
d. The licensee must cover local community issues or ensure
that the broker does.
e. The licensee must continue to comply with the FCC's polit-
ical programming rules, and ensure that the broker does so as
well. 161
The Bureau has repeatedly stated that the licensee "must" obey
these requirements. 62 . The Bureau has usually made these state-
ments in the context in dicta within declaratory rulings, rather than
in adjudications holding that the licensee violated Commission
rules. For example, in Huberman the Bureau approved a time
brokerage agreement, but warned the parties that "[tihe licensee
must oversee, and take ultimate responsibility for, the broker's
advertising and programming practices with respect to [the Com-
mission's political programming rules].' 63 Similarly, in Monahan
the Bureau stated that the time brokerage agreements at issue "ap-
pear to comply with the Commission's time brokerage policy"' 6
but "remind[ed] [the brokered licensee] that it must continue to air
its own station identifications, maintain its own studio within its
principal community contour, and maintain its own public inspec-
161. See Bryant, 6 F.C.C.R. at 6123 (listing rules); see also Huberman, 6 F.C.C.R.
at 5398; Monahan, 6 F.C.C.R. at 1867-68; Fresno, 6 F.C.C.R. at 1572 (describing licens-
ee's political broadcasting obligations as "non-delegable responsibilities"); Memorandum,
supra note 13, at 8 (if licensee violates above-mentioned rules, its chances of renewal
may be reduced).
162. See, e.g., Huberman, 6 F.C.C.R. at 5398; Monahan, 6 F.C.C.R. at 1867.
163. Huberman, 6 F.C.C.R. at 5398.
164. Monahan, 6 F.C.C.R. at 1867.
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tion file, including the obligation to cover local community is-
sues."' 165  The Bureau added that the brokered licensee must "re-
main responsive to the needs of its community of license"'66 and
"oversee, and take ultimate responsibility for, the broker's advertis-
ing and programming practices with respect to [political program-
ming]. 167 Thus, it appears that a licensee's main studio, community
service, and political broadcasting obligations are requirements
which licensees must obey, rather than mere factors which the FCC
weighs in determining whether a licensee has retained control of its
station.
2. General Contract Language
The FCC is more likely to approve a time brokerage agreement
if it contains general language that lays out the licensee's responsi-
bility for programming.1 68 However, such language is not always
dispositive. In Carta, a time brokerage agreement provided that
the licensee "reserves the right to determine, select, supervise and
control program content."' 169  However, the ALJ found that the
broker "decide[d] the content, topics and scheduling of pro-
grams." 170 For example, one of the broker's employees "deter-
mine[d] what topics will be covered in public affairs program-
ming.' ' 171 Moreover, the licensee made little effort to monitor the
broker's programming, allowed the broker to provide less than 15
165. Id.
166. Id. The Bureau's statements that licensees must cover community issues could
be interpreted to mean that the licensee itself, rather than the broker, must carry public
affairs programming. Because the Bureau has approved 24-hour time brokerage agree-
ments, this interpretation of Bureau precedent is probably incorrect. See Huberman, 6
F.C.C.R. at 5397 (approving 24-hour time brokerage agreement). Thus, it appears that
the broker must monitor the broker's community service.
167. Monahan, 6 F.C.C.R. at 1867-68.
168. See, e.g, American Music Radio, 1995 FCC LEXIS 5460 at *15 (approving
contract "replete with provisions reserving ultimate control over broadcasting content" to
licensee); WGPR, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8142 (approving LMA providing that licensee "holds
ultimate control" over programs); Piney Creek, No. BALCT-940429KE, slip op. at 3
(approving LMA which stated that licensee would have "sole responsibility" for ascertain-
ing community needs and providing public affairs programming).
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minutes of public affairs programming per week, 72 failed to moni-
tor compliance with a wide variety of FCC regulations, 73 "ha[d] no
idea of what is being broadcast over [the station]"' 7 4 and "could
care less."' 175 Based on these factors, the ALJ found that "whereas
the time brokerage contract nominally reserved in [the licensee] the
right to select, direct, and control the programming of [the station],
the practice made utterly hollow the contract provision."'76 Thus,
a licensee will not prove that it controls a station merely by placing
a general assurance that it controls programming in a time broker-
age agreement. Instead, the licensee should actually control pro-
gramming by avoiding the Carta licensee's missteps. For example,
a careful licensee should ascertain the broker's plans regarding
public affairs programming, or give the broker detailed advice
about compliance with FCC regulations. 77 In sum, contract provi-
sions stating that the licensee controls programming are not suffi-
cient to establish licensee control.
3. Other Laws and FCC Regulations
A licensee's failure to comply with laws and FCC regulations
other than § 310(d) 78 may be used to support a finding that a li-
censee has unlawfully transferred control of a station to its brokers.
For example, in Cosmopolitan, the full Commission revoked a
radio station's license because the licensee had relinquished all
control over the station's programming to various time brokers. 179
The Commission explained that the licensee's failure to supervise
172. Id.
173. Id. at 7979 (noting that licensee had no procedures to ensure that broker com-
plied with political programming rules, sponsorship identification rules, lottery rules,
payola/plugola rules, or prohibition on false advertising).
174. Id. at 7983.
175. Id.
176. Fresno, 6 F.C.C.R. at 1571 (Review Board decision describing AL decision);
see also Carta, 4 F.C.C.R. at 7983 (although licensee "reserves the right to determine,
select, supervise and control program content. . . . [it] has never exercised any such
right").
177. See Carta, 4 F.C.C.R. at 7978-79 (criticizing licensee for failing to control
programming).
178. 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1988).
179. Cosmopolitan, 59 F.C.C.2d at 560.
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its brokers caused numerous violations of Commission rules, in-
cluding, but not limited to, the promotion of a lottery, false and
misleading advertisements, improper logging, failure to meet filing
requirements, and inadequate record keeping.1 80 The Commission
stated that these violations were evidence of the licensee's loss of
control over station operations' 81 and were so egregious that they
justified denial of the licensee's renewal application.1 82
On the other hand, a time brokerage agreement is more likely
to be approved if it explicitly provides that a licensee retains re-
sponsibility for compliance with FCC rules.18 3 In fact, the Com-
mission's rules require time brokerage agreements to certify that
the licensee "maintains ultimate control over the station's facili-
ties."' 184 However, such qualifying language is not dispositive, and
the FCC will look behind the terminology of a time brokerage
agreement to see if the broker has in fact taken control of a sta-
tion. 18
4. Preemption
Numerous cases have upheld time brokerage agreements be-
cause, among other factors, the licensee reserved the right to pre-
empt programs at will. For example, in Piney Creek a time broker-
age agreement provided that the licensee could delete or preempt
a broker's programs: "(1) to ensure the transmission of [the licens-
ee's] public service programming; (2) when [the licensee] believes
the brokered programming to be contrary to the local interest; [and]
(3) to substitute programming which, in [the licensee's] opinion is
of greater local or national importance."' 186 The Bureau did not
discuss the preemption agreement in detail or explain whether this
180. Id.; see also Memorandum, supra note 13, at 8 ("a pattern of.relatively minor
violations could result in a finding that the licensee had failed to exercise adequate con-
trol").
181. Cosmopolitan, 59 F.C.C.2d at 563-64.
182. Id. at 564.
183. See Piney Creek, No. BALCT-940429KE, slip op. at 3-4; Russo, 5 F.C.C.R. at
7587.
184. 47 C.F.R. §73.3555(a)(2)(ii) (1994).
185. See, e.g., Rosenblum, No. 8210-AJ, slip op. at 4 (finding that licensee had
abdicated control despite LMA language stating that licensee retained control).
186. Piney Creek, No. BALCT-940429KE, slip op. at 3.
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provision was ideal. However, the Bureau did list the preemption
agreement as one of several factors supporting its conclusion that
the agreement "does not raise concerns about [the licensee's] man-
agement of [the station]."' 7 Although the Bureau did not fully
explain the basis for its ruling in Piney Creek, that case indicates
that a licensee is more likely to be found to control station pro-
gramming if it can preempt the brokers' programs based on vague
concepts such as "greater local or national importance" or "local
interest".
Similarly, in Rosenberg, the brokered licensee asserted that a
time brokerage agreement did not violate § 310(d) because "it
retain[ed] the right to refuse or preempt programs as it s[aw] fit."'8 8
After citing this argument and several others raised by the licensee,
the Bureau stated without elaboration that "no substantial and mate-
rial question of fact has been presented that Capitol, the licensee,
has not retained ultimate control over the operation of [its sta-
tions]."' 89 Both Rosenberg and Piney Creek appear to stand for the
proposition that a licensee is more likely to obtain FCC approval
of a time brokerage agreement if the agreement gives the licensee
absolute power to preempt the broker's programming.
The FCC has also approved licensee preemption of brokers'
advertisements. In one case, the Bureau approved a time brokerage
agreement because, inter alia, it gave the licensee the power to
reject advertisements." 9° In another case, the Bureau held that a
187. Id.
188. Rosenberg, 8 F.C.C.R. at 5570; see also American Music Radio, 1995 FCC
LEXIS 5460 at * 14 (upholding LMA where licensee reserved right "to preempt program-
ming when circumstances warrant"); WGPR, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8142 (upholding LMA giving
licensee broad preemption rights); Paramount, No. 1800EI-AL, slip op. at 8 (upholding
agreement providing that licensee could preempt broker's public programs in order to
substitute programs "of greater local or national public importance"); Russo, 5 F.C.C.R.
at 7587 (finding that licensee retained control over programming because time brokerage
agreement provided that "licensee may suspend or cancel any programs that the licensee
or its general manager determine are not in compliance with the standards set forth by the
respective stations"); Bryant, 6 F.C.C.R. at 6123 (approving time brokerage agreement
providing that licensee "receives all programming in advance and can preempt, suspend
or cancel any programming").
189. Rosenberg, 8 F.C.C.R. at 5570.
190. See Russo, 5 F.C.C.R. at 7587; see also WGPR, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8142 (upholding
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licensee "exercised adequate controls on the brokers. Thus, it..
. limited the amount of advertising that could be broadcast."' 9 It
therefore appears that to increase the likelihood of Commission
approval, a time brokerage agreement should give the licensee as
much discretion as possible to preempt or limit a broker's program-
ming and advertising.
Even where preemption provisions in agreements approved by
the FCC have appeared to limit the licensee's preemption rights,
they have been so broadly drawn (e.g. by allowing licensees to
preempt programs of "less importance" than other programs) as to
give the licensee nearly absolute discretion to preempt. 192 Thus,
drafters of time brokerage agreements would be well-advised to
give licensees absolute preemption powers. Such provisions are
supported not only by FCC case law but by common sense: if a
licensee cannot preempt the broker's programs, it can hardly be
said to control station programming.'93
5. Program Review and Monitoring
In order to decide which programs to preempt, a licensee may
wish to make some effort to review programs before they are aired.
For example, 'in Bryant the Bureau approved a time brokerage
agreement in part because the licensee reviewed all programs in
advance.194 Similarly, in Paramount the Bureau favorably cited an
LMA provision stating that the broker "is obligated under the
agreement to give [the licensee] at least 24 hours notice of substan-
tial and material changes in programming." 195
At a minimum, the licensee should make some effort to monitor
LMA allowing deletion of commercials which did not comply with FCC rules or other
laws).
191. Broadcast Communications, 93 F.C.C.2d at 1168 (citation omitted).
192. See, e.g., Piney Creek, No. BALCT-940429KE, slip op. at 3.
193. This author notes that most attorneys and broadcasters seem to agree with this
proposition, because nearly all time brokerage agreements contain preemption provisions.
See Sewell, supra note 4, at 97 (of 20 randomly selected time brokerage agreements, all
"grant the licensee the right to reject a program provided by the broker or to substitute
programming the licensee believes has greater local or national interest").
194. See Bryant, 6 F.C.C.R. at 6123.
195. Paramount, No. 1800EI-AL, slip op. at 8.,
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programs after they are broadcast, lest it suffer the fate of the
Carta licensee. In Carta an AU found that a licensee had trans-
ferred control of its station to a time broker where the licensee had
"no idea"'196 what was broadcast over the station and "could care
less."' 97 The AU admitted that the time brokerage agreement gave
the licensee the right to control program content, but found that this
right was not dispositive where the licensee had never exercised
it.198 Consequently, a provision in a time brokerage agreement
providing that the licensee will supervise station content is no sub-
stitute for actual monitoring of station content.
6. 24 Hour Brokerage
Some time brokerage agreements allow brokers to program all
of a station's programming, thus eliminating a licensee's opportuni-
ty to air its own programs.' 99 Based on Rosenberg and American
Music Radio, it could be argued that the FCC disfavors such agree-
ments. In Rosenberg, the Bureau approved a time brokerage agree-
ment because, among other factors, the licensee "reserve[d] six
hours of programming for itself.' '2°° Correspondingly, in American
Music Radio,20 ' the full Commission noted that "[flurther support-
ing the conclusion that the licensee retained control over program-
ming in this case was the fact that under the agreement, [the licens-
ee] had reserved to itself one hour of programming each Sunday
morning. ' '202 These determinations appear to indicate, at first
glance, that the FCC condemns 24-hour time brokerage agreements.
However, this is not the whole story.
The FCC's 1980 Policy Statement states that "the amount of
196. Carta, 4 F.C.C.R. at 7983.
197. Id.
198. Id. (citation to record omitted).
199. See, e.g., Huberman, 6 F.C.C.R. at 5397.
200. Rosenberg, 8 F.C.C.R. at 5570.
201. In re American Music Radio, No. BAL-930210ED, 1995 FCC LEXIS 5460
(July 31 1995).
202. Id. at *14; see also Larson, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8255 (rejecting time brokerage
agreement where all but one of brokered station's programs were selected by broker);
Bryant, 6 F.C.C.R. at 6123 (upholding time brokerage agreement where parties entered
into time brokerage agreement, yet licensee continued to "produce or purchase programs
for the periods not brokered").
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time brokerage is not really the issue. Instead it is the degree to
which the licensee abdicated its responsibilities to the time bro-
kers., 20 3 In Huberman, the Bureau approved a 24-hour time bro-
kerage agreement and stated that "in removing time brokering
agreements from the purview of the cross-interest policy, the Com-
mission [did not] set limits on the amount of time a brokered sta-
tion could sell . . . a station that airs brokered programming 24
hours per day, as proposed in this agreement, must nevertheless
remain responsive to the needs of its community of license."2
Thus, both the full Commission and the Bureau have suggested that
24-hour agreements are permissible if other FCC requirements are
met.
The FCC's two lines of cases can almost certainly be recon-
ciled. Both cases allowing 24-hour brokerage and those endorsing
less extensive20 5 brokerage are consistent with the propositions that
less extensive agreements are preferable, but 24-hour time broker-
age agreements are acceptable if the licensee has otherwise main-
tained control of a station.206 Nevertheless, the FCC could serve
broadcasters' needs by clarifying this issue.
7. Licensees, Brokers and Networks
Three cases have addressed the proper scope of the relation-
ships between licensees, brokers and broadcast networks. The re-
cent WGPR case involved a licensee and a time broker who hap-
pened to be a national television network (CBS). In WGPR, CBS
entered into a time brokerage agreement with a local television
station, the brokered station's licensee then applied to sell the sta-
tion to CBS, and a local group objected on the ground that the
203. Policy Statement, 82 F.C.C.2d at 114.
204. Huberman, 6 F.C.C.R. at 5397. Cf. Paramount, No. 1800EI-AL, slip op. at 9
(approving time brokerage agreement allowing broker to program 162 hours per week out
of a possible 168 because agreement otherwise gave licensee "ample rights to exercise
control").
205. This author notes that the majority of time brokerage agreements reserve some
(but very little) time for licensee programming. One survey of 20 randomly selected time
brokerage agreements found that 14 reserved between one-half and four hours per week
for the licensee, while 6 reserved no time at all for licensee programming. See Sewell,
supra note 4, at 97-98.
206. See, e.g., Huberman, 6 F.C.C.R. at 5398.
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licensee had already transferred control of station programming to
CBS. 20 7 The application's opponent reasoned that CBS controlled
station programming because the station canceled numerous local
programs and substituted CBS programs, and the licensee's letters
to local program producers stated, among other things, that CBS
rather than the licensee might cancel local programs. °
The full Commission nevertheless found that the evidence
"merely demonstrate[d] threshold programming decisions rendered
by CBS in programming the station, clearly the proper domain of
the broker in a local marketing arrangement. ' 2 ° In support of this
conclusion, the Commission noted that the letters in question were
signed by the licensee's own employees and instructed the pro-
grammers to contact the licensee's employees about technical prob-
lems.2 0 Thus, the letters "appear to represent [the licensee's] ratifi-
cation of CBS's programming plans, as well as to evidence [its]
intention to retain the long-time station program director in a super-
visory capacity. ' '21
In WGPR, the Commission implied that the network/affiliate
relationship between a broker and a licensee alone does not con-
stitute an unauthorized transfer of control. However, the Commis-
sion's emphasis on the details of the letters suggests that WGPR
might have been decided differently if the licensee had terminated
its program director or allowed the network to directly contact
programmers.
Although the licensee can enter into an LMA with a network,
it cannot allow a non-network to take over all dealings between a
brokered station and a network. For example, in Larson, the Bu-
reau found that a station had violated § 310(d) where (among other
relevant factors) the licensee had virtually no dealings with the
207. See WGPR, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8140.
208. Id. at 8142. Other letters to program producers stated that CBS was dedicating
certain airtime to religious programming, and congratulated programmers for remaining
with the "WGPR-CBS ... broadcast line-up." Id.





national radio network that produced programs used by the sta-
tion.212 Similarly, in Carta an ALJ found that a licensee abdicated
control of its station by allowing the broker to enter into network
affiliation agreements that listed the broker as the brokered sta-
tion's licensee.213
In sum, a licensee can enter into a time brokerage agreement
with a national network, but the licensee/network relationship will
be governed by the same restrictions applicable to other time bro-
kerage agreements. Moreover, a network affiliate which has en-
tered into a time brokerage agreement should continue to have
some relationship with the network.
D. Other Station Management Issues
As noted above,1 4 the FCC has held that a time brokerage
agreement is not an unlawful abdication of control unless "the
brokered station had or would abdicate ultimate control in the areas
of finances, personnel matters, and programming., 215 However, the
FCC's time brokerage cases have addressed a wide variety of is-
sues which do not fit comfortably into any of these categories.
1. Restraints on Alienation
In Piney Creek, the Bureau generally approved of an assign-
ment application which contained a time brokerage agreement, but
conditioned its approval of the application on the deletion of a
sentence within the agreement which stated:
Specifically, the Agreement shall not terminate upon the
sale of the Station to a successor licensee or upon a transfer
of control of Licensee, but shall be assigned to or assumed
by any subsequent owner of the Station, subject to prior
consent of Broker.21 6
The Bureau explained that under that sentence, the station could
only be sold to buyers who were willing to assume the time bro-
212. See Larson, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8255 (where the Bureau noted that the broker
negotiated with the network to buy its programs, and paid the network for those pro-
grams).
213. See Carta, 4 F.C.C.R. at 7983.
214. See supra text accompanying note 69.
215. Huberman, 6 F.C.C.R. at 5397.
216. Piney Creek, No. BALCT-940429KE, slip op. at 4.
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kerage agreement.21 7 The Bureau found that such provisions im-
peded the right of the licensee to sell its station, and thereby trans-
ferred control of the station. 218  By conditioning the grant of an
otherwise innocuous application on the deletion of the time broker-
age agreement's restraints on alienation, Piney Creek arguably
prohibits contract terms which require future licensees to assume
a time brokerage agreement and that make such an assumption
subject to the broker's consent. However, conversations with pri-
vate attorneys who have spoken with Bureau staff suggest that it is
not entirely clear whether the Bureau is internally divided over
Piney Creek,219 or whether the FCC will follow Piney Creek in
future cases.220 If the Bureau is internally divided over Piney Creek,
future FCC decisions may overrule Piney Creek or interpret it nar-
rowly.
2. Termination Provisions
FCC case law is equivocal regarding provisions in time broker-
age agreements which restrict the licensee's right to terminate such
agreements. On the one hand, in Rosenblum, the Bureau rejected
a time brokerage agreement which allowed the broker to terminate
the agreement, but which gave the licensee no reciprocal right.22'
The Bureau stated that the licensee "must be able to determine, in
its sole discretion, whether at any point in the life of the agree-
ment, the programming [the broker] provides no longer serves the
public interest., 222 Similarly, in Larson the Bureau found that a
broker controlled the brokered station where an LMA provided that
the licensee could not terminate the agreement without repurchas-
ing station assets from the broker.223
217. id. at 4-5.
218. Id.
219. The Piney Creek decision was authored not by the head of the Bureau as a
whole, but by the chief of its Video Services Division. Id. at 5.
220. See FCBA Seminar--Communications Industry Ownership Rules-Security
Interests, LMAs, Time Brokerage, and Tax Certifications (May 4, 1995) (audiotape avail-
able from Federal Communications Bar Association) (some attorneys suggested that Bu-
reau may be internally divided over Piney Creek).
221. See Rosenblum, No. 8210-AJ, slip op. at 4.
222. Id.
223. See Larson, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8255; see also Silva, 9 F.C.C.R. at 6158 (upholding
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Thus, Rosenblum and Larson imply that the licensee must be
allowed to terminate a time brokerage agreement at will because
control of programming necessarily requires that the licensee
should be able to decide when to stop airing a broker's programs.224
However, a recent FCC decision has muddled the law regarding
termination clauses in time brokerage agreements. In American
Music Radio, an LMA contained two restrictions on the licensee's
right to terminate the agreement. First, the LMA provided that
each party to the agreement had to give the other party 90 days'
notice before terminating the agreement.225 The FCC found that
this provision did not invalidate the LMA because the agreement
gave the licensee "the right, which shall not be unreasonably in-
voked, to terminate this Agreement at any time for reasons of com-
pelling public interest ' 226 and it "contain[ed] an exception to the
requirement to give such prior notice if such provision were other-
wise contrary to law., 227 The Commission's decision did not ex-
plain, however, when a termination restriction would be "otherwise
contrary to law," nor did it explain when the right to terminate
would be "unreasonably invoked."
The American Music Radio agreement's second restriction on
termination was a requirement that "if the termination is contested,
any dispute is to be resolved by arbitration., 228 The FCC explained
that such a requirement was "designed merely to ensure the reason-
ableness, and thus, the good faith, of any decision by the licensee
to terminate the time brokerage agreement on public interest
grounds. ' 229 The FCC did not explain when a termination decision
would be "reasonable." Because of the vague language of the
agreement at issue, the American Music Radio decision is a recipe
for continued confusion.
LMA where licensee could terminate whenever it "believes that continuation of the
Agreement would be contrary to the public interest").
224. See Rosenblum, No. 8210-AJ, slip op. at 4 (restrictions on termination improper
because a licensee "must be able to determine, in its sole discretion, whether ... the
programming [the broker] provides no longer serves the public interest").
225. American Music Radio, 1995 FCC Lexis 5460 at *9.
226. Id. at *18.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at *19 n.10.
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The FCC has also stated that a time brokerage agreement might
be unreasonable if "a licensee agrees to an excessive liquidated
damages clause., 230 However, the Bureau has construed "exces-
siveness" narrowly. In Paramount, a time brokerage .agreement
provided that "the party terminating the agreement must ... pay
the other party one million dollars. '23' The Bureau nevertheless
upheld the agreement for two reasons. First, $1 million was only
"three percent of the purchase price of the station.' 232 Second,the
damages were not due until six months after termination. 233 It
therefore appears that the excessiveness of a clause depends on the
size of the transaction and the timing of the payment of the damag-
es.
In sum, it appears that a time brokerage agreement should give
a licensee the right to terminate the agreement at will, but may
contain some type of liquidated damages clause. The Commission
has not yet explained when a liquidated damages provision is so
''excessive" as to invalidate a time brokerage agreement.
3. Term Length
The FCC has repeatedly stated that "unreasonably long terms
in [time brokerage] agreements may call into question a licensee's
control of its station.,,234 The only case directly applying this rule,
Paramount, upheld a time brokerage agreement because "the origi-
nal provision setting a term of five years and two additional five-
year renewals ... [was] reformed by the parties to the agreement
in accordance with a ten-year limitation we require of all television
brokerage arrangements. 235 But in Rosenblum, the FCC rejected
a time brokerage agreement which included a 40-year equipment
lease with a broker because such a provision, "as opposed to an
arrangement with a disinterested party, suggests that [the licensee]
would play, at most, a minor role in the construction of its own
230. Revision 11, 7 F.C.C.R. at 6402.
231. Paramount, No. 1800EI-AL, slip op. at 10.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Revision 11, 9 F.C.C.R. at 7193 (citing Revision 11, 7 F.C.C.R. at 6402).
235. Paramount, No. 1800EI-AL, slip op. at 10.
[Vol. 6:1
TIME BROKERAGE AGREEMENTS
station., 236 Thus, the FCC has set a 10-year time limit for televi-
sion time brokerage agreements, but has not adopted a "bright line"
approach in cases involving radio stations. Because the Paramount
decision did not explain the basis for the 10-year-time limit, it is
unclear why the FCC has created a "bright line" rule for television
LMAs, but not for radio LMAs.
4. FCC Forms
The ALJ in Carta noted that the broker's "general manager
filed an annual employment report with the Commission listing
both [broker and licensee] employees. [The licensee] on the other
hand, did not file an ownership report or an employment report for
1987.,,237 Although this factor alone was not outcome-determina-
tive, the ALJ cited it as evidence that the broker "has acted as if it
is in full control of [the brokered station]. 238 By contrast, in Para-
mount the Bureau approved a time brokerage agreement where the
would-be licensee's FCC forms were prepared and prosecuted by
its own attorney. 239 It can be inferred that the Bureau is more like-
ly to approve a time brokerage agreement where the licensee (or its
own attorney) prepares the brokered station's FCC forms, and less
likely to approve such an agreement if the broker or its employees
files FCC reports on the brokered station's behalf.
5. Some Irrelevant Factors
In addition to using various factors to support its acceptance or
rejection of time brokerage agreements, the FCC has also occasion-
ally stated that certain factors are irrelevant to whether a broker
controlled a station. 240 For example, in Piney Creek, the Bureau
stated that a prior attempt by the broker's owner to enter into a
236. Rosenblum, No. 8210-AJ, slip op. at 3.
237. See Carta, 4 F.C.C.R. at 7983; see also Larson, 10 F.C.C.R. 8255 (rejecting
LMA where broker prepared FCC forms).
238. Carta, 4 F.C.C.R. at 7983. The AL's discussion of the broker's control over
the brokered station included thirteen paragraphs of discussion. Id. at 7982-84. Thus, the
broker's misuse of FCC forms was just one of numerous factors supporting the AU's
ultimate decision that the licensee had abdicated control of its station. Id. at 7982; see
also Memorandum, supra note 14, at 6 (licensee responsible for all filing obligations).
239. See Paramount, No. 1800EI-AL, slip op. at 7.
240. See infra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
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time brokerage agreement with the licensee was "irrelevant to the
consideration of this application. 24' Similarly, in Paramount, the
Bureau held that the buyer's submission of a draft time brokerage
agreement to FCC staff was merely "an attempt to prepare an
agreement in compliance with Commission rules and policies, and
not an attempt to insert provisions advantageous to itself. 2 42 Thus,
the "Buyer's lack of participation at that stage is not evidence of
[the broker's] control over Buyer., 243
In sum, the FCC will not rely upon the broker's past attempts
to enter into time brokerage agreements or the buyer's submission
of draft agreements to the FCC staff in determining whether a
broker controls a brokered station.
E. Television and Time Brokerage
On June 1, 1995, the Bureau issued a "Public Notice" which
imposed special restrictions on applications proposing that televi-
sion stations be operated under time brokerage agreements. The
Public Notice provided that the Bureau would decline to process
such applications if:
1. The broker proposed to finance the acquisition of the station
by the licensee, either in whole or in part, and to hold an option to
purchase the station in the future. Thus, broker financing alone is
not dispositive.24
2. The broker proposed financing station acquisition, but not
to hold an option, and the loan was dependent on the time broker-
age agreement. "In other words, a default or termination of the
[agreement] cannot trigger acceleration of repayment of the loan.
Additionally, the broker may not attempt to acquire control of the
241. Piney Creek, No. BALCT-940429KE, slip op. at 4; see also Huberman, 6
F.C.C.R. at 5397 (contour overlap between stations owned by parties to agreement not
dispositive).
242. Paramount, No. 1800EI-AL, slip op. at 7.
243. Id.
244. See FCC Public Notice, Processing of Applications Governing Local Marketing
Agreements, 1995 FCC LEXIS 3593 at *1 (M. Med. Bur. June 1, 1995); see also Para-
mount, No. 1800EI-AL, slip op. at 1I (upholding time brokerage agreement where broker
lent buyer 1/3 of station's purchase price).
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station through the loan agreement. "  "
3. The broker held an option, but no loan, and the option term
was not "of an appropriate' duration"246 or the option agreement
involved "upfront payments of all, or substantially all, of the sta-
tion's value. 247
It is unclear whether the Bureau will apply these guidelines in
contexts outside the processing of applications, for example when
renewing licenses. Nevertheless, the "Public Notice" makes it clear
that the Bureau will scrutinize television time brokerage agreements
closely if the broker has 'an option to purchase the brokered station
or if the broker finances the licensee's acquisition of the brokered
station. Such agreements are clearly inadvisable if they run afoul
of the restrictions set forth in the "Public Notice."
III. THE CASE FOR RULEMAKING
To this point, the FCC has addressed the question of when a
broker controls a brokered station on a case-by-case basis, rather
than enacting general rules governing the issue. However, the
FCC's policy of case-by-case adjudication currently inconveniences
attorneys and broadcasters. Consequently, the enactment of a rule
governing time brokerage would improve upon the status quo as
the arguments supporting case-by-case adjudication are no longer
persuasive.
A. The Case Against the Status Quo
In its time brokerage cases, the FCC has addressed a wide vari-
ety of issues. However, its decisions have left attorneys and broad-
casters with little guidance, for three reasons.
First, the FCC's decisions have occasionally been inconsistent.
For example, the Bureau appeared to endorse LMA provisions
245. Public Notice, 1995 FCC LEXIS 3593 at *2; see also Paramount, No. 1800EI-
AL, slip op. at 11-12 (upholding time brokerage agreement where neither broker nor other
lender made loans dependent on continuation of agreement).
246. Public Notice, 1995 FCC LEXIS 3593 at *2-3.
247. Id. at *3.
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giving the broker an option to buy the brokered station in Russo,248
but appeared to oppose such provisions in Larson.249 Similarly, in
Rosenberg the Bureau approved a time brokerage agreement be-
cause the licensee reserved programming time for itself,z 0 even
though the full Commission had stated earlier that "the amount of
time brokerage is not really the issue. 251
Second, even uncontradicted Bureau decisions may not be good
law. For instance, in Rosenblum the Bureau held that time broker-
age agreements should allow licensees to terminate such agree-
ments at will, and rejected an agreement which limited a licensee's
termination rights.252 However, it appears that the Bureau has re-
cently advised attorneys that it may allow brokers to partially re-
strict licensees' termination rights.253 So long as the Commission
fails to issue general rules, even attorneys who diligently seek to
comply with the Bureau's past rulings may be surprised by its
future rulings.
Third, even where the Bureau's past rulings are unchallenged,
such rulings provide inadequate guidance. Frequently, Bureau
decisions regarding time brokerage cite a large number of factors,
without indicating which factors are the most important. For exam-
ple, in Larson, where the broker had unlawfully delegated con-
trol, 4 the Bureau stated that "[t]he facts leading to this conclusion
are as follows 2 55 and listed a dozen relevant factors without ex-
plaining their importance. 6  Admittedly, the Bureau did make
248. See Russo, 5 F.C.C.R. at 7586.
249. See Larson, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8254; see also supra notes 114-19 and accompany-
ing text (describing both Russo and Larson, among other relevant cases, in greater detail).
250. See Rosenberg, 8 F.C.C.R. at 5570.
251. Policy Statement, 82 F.C.C.2d at 114; see also discussion supra part III.C.6 and
accompanying text (describing and seeking to reconcile relevant cases).
252. See Rosenblum, No. 8210-AJ, slip op. at 4.
253. See FCBA Seminar, supra note 220. See also supra notes 25-29 and accompa-
nying text (suggesting that termination rights need not be absolute).
254. Larson, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8255.
255. Id.
256. Id. The Larson decision is hardly unique. See, e.g., Rosenblum, No. 8210-AJ,
slip op. at 3-4 (listing several contract provisions to support finding that licensee abdicat-
ed control of station finances, and listing numerous other factors to support broader
conclusion that broker unlawfully controlled station).
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some effort to organize its decision by dividing its discussion into
four paragraphs: (1) a paragraph describing the agreement, which
noted that under the agreement, the broker selected almost all of
the station's programming, sold all the station's commercial time,
bought the station's equipment from the licensee and then leased
it back to the licensee for a nominal amount, could terminate the
agreement more easily than could the licensee,257 paid the licensee
a monthly brokerage fee, and had an option to buy the station;
258
(2) a paragraph concerning programming, which pointed out that
the broker rather than the licensee made payments to a nationwide
radio network and the broker's employees dealt with the network;
(3) a paragraph regarding personnel which noted, among other
things, that after the agreement was executed all four of the licens-
ee's employees were placed on the broker's payroll, three were
later terminated, and the fourth was only a part-time employee; 259
and (4) a paragraph discussing finances which pointed out that after
the agreement was executed all of the station's operation expenses
were paid by the broker.260
No attorney or broadcaster who reviewed Larson could guess
with certainty which of these factors were important, which were
of minor significance, and which were merely part of the factual
context of the Bureau's decision. Thus, Larson is-hopelessly con-
fusing.26 t
257. Specifically, the agreement provided that either party could terminate the agree-
ment upon one year's notice, but that the licensee's cancellation would be effective only
if, at the option of the broker, the licensee repurchased station assets from the broker at
fair market value. Larson, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8255.
258. Id.
259. Id. The Bureau added that the broker's employees prepared the station's FCC
forms and answered the station's telephone. Id.
260. Id.
261. Because the Bureau stated that the broker's control of the station began on
January 18, 1991 (the date of the agreement), id., it could be argued that all indicia of
control which began after January 18 were irrelevant to the Bureau's decision. These
indicia include the broker's relations with a national radio network, the broker's termina-
tion of station employees and use of its own employees to fill out FCC forms and answer
telephones, and the broker's payment of operating expenses. Id. However, these facts
were intermingled with the events of January 18, in paragraphs immediately preceded by
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In sum, attorneys and broadcasters need guidance from the FCC
in order to draft time brokerage agreements which do not violate
§ 310(d). To date, the FCC has not provided such guidance; even
when the FCC's decisions are wholly consistent, they are often too
poorly drafted to be reliable precedent:
B. The Advantages of Rulemaking
The FCC has an alternative to continued chaos: rulemaking.
The Administrative Procedure Act defines a "rule" as "the whole
or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicabili-
ty and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe
law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice
requirements of an agency .... 99262 Administrative agencies nearly
always use rules to announce principles of general applicability.263
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency can promulgate
new rules only after it has given the public notice of the proposed
rule, and has provided the public with the opportunity to submit
comments about the proposal.26
The FCC could dispel public confusion about time brokerage
by issuing a rule setting forth the factors which it would scrutinize
most closely in determining whether a time brokerage agreement
unlawfully transferred control of a station to a broker. Such a rule
need not set forth all relevant factors. Instead, the FCC could set
forth a nonexclusive list of factors which it deems to be especially
relevant to the question of control. The promulgation of a time
brokerage rule would have five advantages over continued FCC
reliance on case-by-case adjudication.
First, and most importantly, a time brokerage rule would be
fairer than adjudication because it would provide parties with ad-
the statement "[t]he facts leading to this conclusion are as follows." Id. Thus, it is by
no means clear that the Bureau meant to ignore post-January 18 facts. Even if it did, the
Bureau lists numerous January 18 events (e.g. various terms of the agreement, the switch
of numerous employees to the licensee's payroll) without weighing or explaining their
importance. See id.
262. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1994).
263. See 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 6.1, at 226-27 (3d ed. 1994).
264. 5 U.S.C. §553(b)-(c) (1994).
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vahce notice as to what conduct would be permissible.2 65  The
FCC's adjudicative decisions are often so narrowly written that
attorneys cannot tell which factors automatically invalidate a time
brokerage agreement and which are of marginal relevance. For
example, in Larson the Bureau listed a dozen factors to be among
the facts "leading to [its] conclusion,' 266 without clearly stating
which factors were significant and which were.
Second, rulemaking proceedings are fairer and usually yield
higher quality decisions than adjudication.267 When an agency
requests public comment on a proposed rule, it may receive com-
ments from dozens of sources.268 For example, in 1992 the FCC
issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 269 regarding its television
broadcasting regulations. In response to this Notice, the FCC re-
ceived 34 sets of comments and 17 sets of reply comments. 270 The
comments addressed a wide variety of issues. Some commentators
addressed the issue of whether the FCC should limit the number of
stations one licensee can own throughout the nation, others ad-
dressed the issue of whether licensees should be able to own two
television stations in the same city, while others addressed the
question of whether time brokerage agreements should be treated
differently in the television and radio industries.27 ' After receiving
these comments, the FCC decided to issue a Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking so that commenters could reconsider their
265. See I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 263, § 6.7, at 265. This section provides
in pertinent part:
Legislative rules provide affected parties with clearer advance notice of permissible
and impermissible conduct; they avoid the widely disparate temporal impact of "rules"
announced and applied through adjudicatory decision making; and they allow all poten-
tially affected members of the public an opportunity to participate in the process of
determining the rules that affect them. Id.
266. Larson, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8255.
267. 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 263, § 6.7, at 261.
268. See, e.g., Revision II, 7 F.C.C.R. at 6404-05 (listing 46 separate sets of com-
ments in rulemaking proceeding).
269. In re Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcast-
ing, FCC No. 92-209, 7 F.C.C.R. 4111 (F.C.C. 1992).
270. Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC No. 94-322, Appendix A, Pike
& Fischer Radio Regulation, FCC Rules: Current Service 53:399, 428 (1995).
271. Id. at 53:401.
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positions and persons who did not comment in the first proceeding
could take positions in view of the growth of video technology and
the FCC's reregulation of cable television.272 By contrast, when an
agency announces a "rule" in the process of deciding a specific
dispute, it has before it only the evidence that a small number of
parties are willing or able to provide.27
3
Third, because a rulemaking proceeding addresses future fact
patterns as well as existing contracts, commenters will have an
incentive to discuss the possible impact of alternative rules on a
wide variety of possible circumstances.274 By contrast, comments
in adjudicative proceedings tend to focus on the effect of a decision
on the parties themselves.275
Fourth, a rulemaking proceeding might eliminate the need to
relitigate recurring issues,276 thereby saving time for attorneys,
broadcasters and the Commission. Under the current policy of
case-by-case adjudication, the Commission frequently has been
forced to address the same issue in a wide variety of contexts. For
example, in Russo, the Bureau upheld a time brokerage agreement
notwithstanding an option for the broker to purchase the station for
$2 million because the option fee did not represent a present in-
vestment of working capital in the brokered station.277 By contrast,
in Carta an ALJ characterized an option agreement between the
licensee and the broker as a "factor of some significance" 278 which
supported his finding that a brokered licensee had transferred con-
trol of its station to a broker. Thus, Commission case law on this
issue may be internally inconsistent. If the Commission began a
rulemaking proceeding, it might be forced to clarify its views on
heavily litigated issues such as the appropriate treatment of option
contracts and 24-hour time brokerage.279
272. Id. at 53:401-02.
273. 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 263, § 6.7, at 261-62.
274. Id. at 262.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 263.
277. See Russo, 5 F.C.C.R. at 7587.
278. Carta, 4 F.C.C.R. at 7983.
279. See discussion supra part II.A.4, III.C.6 (describing seemingly inconsistent FCC
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Fifth, a rulemaking proceeding is especially appropriate where,
as in the time brokerage context, most agency decisions are made
by subordinate bodies such as the Bureau. This is so because even
if Bureau case law were clear, attorneys would still be uncertain
about the ultimate precedential force of the law because the Bu-
reau's decisions can be overruled by the Commission. Similarly,
decisions by the Bureau's branches and divisions, even if otherwise
clear, also can be overruled by the Bureau. In contrast a rule, by
definition, is issued by the full Commission and cannot be altered
without public notice.
An FCC rulemaking proceeding would make time brokerage
law more predictable, would yield more intelligent results than
adjudication due to the increased quantity and quality of industry
input, might eliminate and clarify apparent inconsistencies within
FCC case law, and would establish the views of the full FCC as
opposed to those of the Bureau or of one of the Bureau's branches.
C. The (Former) Advantages of the Status Quo
In 1992, the FCC decided to address time brokerage on a case-
by-case basis rather than by promulgating time brokerage rules.
When the FCC made this decision, 280 a rulemaking proceeding
would have been inappropriate because the FCC did not have
enough experience with time brokerage to create a broadly applica-
ble rule. However, this argument is no longer tenable for two
reasons. First, the various bureaus, divisions, and branches of the
FCC have addressed over a dozen time brokerage cases in the last
five years. 28' As a result, the FCC now has enough experience
with time brokerage to draw some preliminary conclusions. Sec-
ond, the FCC has evaluated so many time brokerage agreements
that inconsistencies have developed in the case law.
In response to the contentions above, it can be argued that
broadcasters who desire legal advice can always ask for a declara-
tory ruling. However, the process of obtaining a formal written
opinion is significantly more time consuming than reading a Com-
decisions on these issues).
280. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 13-14.
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mission rule.282 Furthermore, the FCC has the discretion to decline
to issue a declaratory ruling. 83
At a minimum, the FCC's rulemaking proceeding should ad-
dress the issues discussed above, and should explicitly overrule any
Bureau or Review Board decisions inconsistent with the FCC's
views. The content of any possible rule is less important than its
clarity. Attorneys must be able to predict the validity of a time
brokerage agreement in order to draft valid agreements and give
their clients valid advice about such agreements. For the same
reason, broadcasters who hope to enter into such agreements need
clearer rules. Additionally, broadcasters that are already parties to
time brokerage agreements need to know how to implement such
agreements without unwittingly transferring control of stations to
brokers.
D. Another Alternative to Adjudication
Even if rulemaking is preferable to adjudication, it will not
eliminate all complexities in time brokerage law, for two reasons.
First, any rule, like any statute, will itself contain ambiguities,
because no rule-drafter can foresee all possible issues that might
arise under the rule.284 Second, rulemaking is arguably slower than
adjudication, because federal agencies may not enact rules without
giving the public notice and an opportunity to comment.285
The FCC could try to avoid these problems by promulgating a
282. For example, in Madden the Commission released a letter thirteen days after
issuing it. See Madden, 6 F.C.C.R. at 1871. The letter in Madden did not state when the
parties requested a declaratory ruling from the Commission. Thus, it is possible that the
parties waited weeks or months for a ruling. Id.
283. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.2 (1994) (stating that FCC "may" issue declaratory ruling to
remove uncertainty).
284. For example, one publishing house has published a six-volume digest devoted
primarily to FCC and judicial interpretations of FCC rules. See Pike & Fischer, Radio
Regulation, Second Series, Digest (1995) (Volume 1 devoted primarily to interpretations
of Communications Act, while other volumes devoted primarily to interpretations of FCC
regulations).
285. See 5 U.S.C. §553(c); supra notes 268-72 and accompanying text (describing




policy statement.28 6  Policy statements differ from rules in two
ways: First, the Administrative Procedure Act specifically ex-
empts policy statements from the "notice and comment" require-
ment. 87 Second, policy statements, unlike rules, are not judicially
enforceable.8 8 It could be argued that a policy statement would be
more efficient than. a full-fledged rule, because the, absence of a
"notice and comment" requirement would allow the FCC to enact
a policy statement quickly.
These advantages of policy statements are outweighed by two
disadvantages. First, a rule may be less ambiguous than a policy
statement, because public comments may force the FCC to recon-
sider and clarify its position.289 Second, a policy statement may
provide less guidance to broadcasters and lawyers than a rule pre-
cisely because it is not legally binding, and therefore might be
ignored by the FCC.29°
Thus, an FCC policy statement on time brokerage would proba-
bly be issued more quickly than an FCC rule, but would probably
be even more ambiguous because of the absence of public com-
ment and the nonbinding nature of policy statements.
CONCLUSION: FINAL SUGGESTIONS FOR BROADCASTERS AND
FOR THE FCC
The FCC's time brokerage decisions guide licensees by explic-
itly stating what licensees must or must not do, and mentioning a
286. Indeed, the FCC has already discussed time brokerage in one policy statement.
See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text; In re Petition for Issuance of Policy
Statement or Notice of Inquiry on Part-Time Programming, 82 F.C.C.2d 107 (1980).
287. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 263, § 6.2 at 228, (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)).
288. Id. (citing Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22 (1977)). In addition, a policy
statement is not judicially reviewable if it has no "binding effect on members of the
public." 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 263, § 6.2 at 229. On the other hand, if a policy
statement is binding on the public, it is a rule for procedural purposes and is subject to
"notice and comment" requirements. See United States Tel. Assoc., v. F.C.C., 28 F.3d
1232, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
289. See supra notes 267-73 and accompanying text (suggesting that extensive public
comments may make rulemaking fairer than adjudication).
290. See United States Tel. Assoc., 28 F.3d at 1234 (pointing out that true policy
statement allows agency to ignore statement in its discretion) (citations omitted).
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particular practice, or its absence, as one of numerous factors sup-
porting a decision that an LMA either does or does not violate §
310(d).
The FCC has mandated that a licensee may delegate day-to-day
operations to a broker, but that it must set policies guiding opera-
tions in three areas: station finances, personnel matters, and pro-
gramming.29' Indeed, some time brokerage agreements must explic-
itly certify that the licensee controls decision making in these ar-
eas.
292
The FCC has been reluctant to mandate any specific contractual
terms regarding finances. However, a time brokerage agreement
will usually be approved if the licensee is responsible for most
station expenses, and will usually be rejected if the broker is re-
sponsible for most station expenses.293 A licensee may also negoti-
ate joint sales efforts with the broker,294 but should not allow the
broker to negotiate such an arrangement with a third party on the
licensee's behalf.295 A broker may structure the brokered licensee's
purchase of a station, at least under certain circumstances.296
A licensee must follow one personnel-related rule-the Com-
mission's "main studio" rule.297 This rule, as interpreted by the
Commission, requires the licensee to maintain its own main studio,
and to retain at least one full-time management employee and one
full-time staff employee at the station during normal business
291. See WGPR, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8141-48.
292. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(a)(2)(ii) (requiring certification where broker and licensee
own nearby stations, and where broker programs over 15% of brokered station's time).
293. See Rosenblum, No. 8210-AJ, slip op. at 3 (rejecting LMA where broker respon-
sible for typical station expenses such as equipment, engineering costs, insurance, utilities
and taxes, paid ASCAP and BMI fees itself); CanXus, 8 F.C.C.R. at 4323 (disapproving
agreement where broker had "substantial" control over advertising revenues and business
expenses); Rosenberg, 8 F.C.C.R. at 5570 (upholding LMA where licensee responsible
for most station expenses); Memorandum, supra note 13, at 5.
294. See Huberman, 6 F.C.C.R. at 5397.
295. See Carta, 4 F.C.C.R. at 7983; see also Memorandum, supra note 13, at 5
(broker may not hold "himself out as the owner of the station in dealings with others").
296. See Paramount, No. 1800EI-AL, slip op. at 6-7 (broker may structure station
sale, at least where buyer is an experienced broadcaster and can reject seller's terms).
297. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1125(a).
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hours.298 A brokered licensee may run afoul of this rule if it allows
its studio to be staffed solely by the broker's employees, but may
share staff with the broker as long as the licensee's own employees
perform station functions during normal business hours. 299  The
Commission has also suggested that time brokerage agreements are
more likely to win Commission approval if the licensee pays most
payroll-related expenses, or hires or approves the hiring of station
employees. 30 ' By contrast, a time brokerage agreement will rarely
meet with Commission approval if the broker discharges most of
the licensee's employees or switches them onto the broker's own
payroll. 30
2
The Commission has been far more willing to set forth specific
requirements regarding broker control of licensee programming
than to create specific rules regarding personnel and finances. For
example, the Commission has stated explicitly that a brokered li-
censee must air announcements identifying the brokered station,
maintain its own file for public inspection, ensure that local com-
munity issues are covered, and ensure that the station complies
with FCC political programming rules.30 3 In addition, the FCC is
more likely to approve a time brokerage agreement if the agree-
ment gives licensees broad preemption rights3°4 and imposes re-
sponsibility for compliance with FCC rules upon the licensee,30 5 or
298. See Jones, 7 F.C.C.R. at 6801-02 (1992), denying reconsideration of 6 F.C.C.R.
3615 (1991) (enunciating rule outside LMA context); Memorandum, supra note 13, at 6
(management employee should have authority over station's programming, report to studio
daily, and work out of studio).
299. See Birdsill, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7891; cf. Memorandum, supra note 13, at 7 (staff
employee should be knowledgeable about "station's public inspection file and other
essential matters, such as how to contact the engineer in case of an emergency").
300. See Silva, 9 F.C.C.R. at 6158.
301. Id. Even if most station employees are the broker's employees, a licensee
would be well-advised to at least ensure that its own managerial employees retain some
power over station operations. See WGPR, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8140 (although broker sent
executive to brokered station, licensee retained control of personnel because it retained
its own employees); Bryant, 6 F.C.C.R. at 6123 (approving LMA Where licensee's "sta-
tion manager and chief engineer maintain[ed] control of station operations").
302. See Larson, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8254; CanXus, 8 F.C.C.R. at 4323-24.
303. See Bryant, 6 F.C.C.R. at 6123; Huberman, 6 F.C.C.R. at 5398.
304. See Rosenberg, 8 F.C.C.R. at 5570; Russo, 5 F.C.C.R. at 7587.
305. See Piney Creek, No. BALCT-940429KE, slip op. at 3; Memorandum, supra
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if the licensee monitors the broker's programming3°6 and sta-
tion/network relations. 30 7
In addition, the FCC has addressed a variety of issues that are
not related to station finances, personnel and programming, but that
are nevertheless relevant to the question of whether a licensee has
abdicated control over a station to a broker.3 °8
However, the FCC has not explained how it balances these
factors, nor has it made any systematic effort to explain which
factors are especially important. As a result, licensees, brokers,
and attorneys cannot accurately predict which provisions belong in
an LMA and which can be safely scuttled.
The FCC has created additional confusion by sending conflict-
ing signals on a number of issues, including:
1. whether a licensee must always pay FCC fines arising out
of a broker's violation of FCC rules;30 9
2. whether the FCC is more likely to reject an LMA if the
broker has an option to purchase the brokered station;310
3. whether the FCC is more likely to reject an LMA if the
broker provides all of the brokered station's programming; 31'
note 13, at 7 (licensee should establish program policies related to FCC rules).
306. See Bryant, 6 F.C.C.R. at 6123 (favorably noting that licensee reviewed all
programs in advance); Carta, 4 F.C.C.R. at 7983 (finding that licensee had transferred
control of brokered station where licensee "could care less" about programming); Memo-
randum, supra note 13, at 7 (licensee may wish to monitor programming by participating
in broker's program planning sessions, keeping log of public service programming, and
keeping record of own input regarding programming).
307. See Larson, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8254 (rejecting LMA where responsibility for
network/station relations wholly delegated to broker).
308. See, e.g., Rosenblum, No. 8210-AJ, slip op. (rejecting LMA because, among
other factors, broker chose call sign, LMA did not give licensee right to terminate and
LMA included 40-year equipment lease from broker); Paramount, No. 1800EI-AL, slip
op. at 10 (television LMAs limited to ten years); Revision 11, 7 F.C.C.R. at 6402 (suggest-
ing that LMA might be unreasonable if liquidated damages "excessive"); Carta, 4
F.C.C.R. at 7983 (broker's filing of FCC forms supported finding that broker controlled
station).
309. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
310. See discussion supra part I1.A.4.
311. See discussion supra part II.C.6.
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4. whether an LMA can provide that the licensee may only sell
the brokered station to buyers who are willing to assume the agree-
ment;312 and
5. when an LMA can restrict the licensee's right to terminate
the agreement.313
Because the law contains numerous ambiguities, the FCC
should begin a rulemaking proceeding to outline which factors it
will consider in determining whether a licensee controls a brokered
station. Further, the rulemaking proceeding should illuminate
which of those factors are significant. Admittedly, the relationship
between a licensee and its broker involves so many variables that
no rule could possibly cover all possible cases, but a new FCC rule
could at least dispel some of the confusion.
312. See discussion supra part II.D.1.
313. See discussion supra part II.D.2.
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